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Abstract
This Note uses the case of Honduran street children to demonstrate that the U.N. Principles
have not been adequately implemented, and argues that the international community should use
the creation of the U.N. Human Rights Council (“Council”) as an opportunity to insist on better
training and monitoring of investigative personnel worldwide. Part I reviews the legal standards
establishing extrajudicial executions of street children as a major human rights violation and the
Honduran State’s duty to investigate. Part I also examines challenges facing Honduran investiga-
tive police agencies, including budget crises and accusations of corruption and complicity. Part I
concludes with a review of the structure and function of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
(“Commission”) and the investigative standards set forth in the U.N. Principles. Part II of this
Note discusses competing frameworks for Commission reform, focusing on the proposal of the
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (“High Level Panel Proposal”), the pro-
posal of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan (“Report of Secretary-General”), and the proposal
of Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) and the international human rights non-governmental organi-
zation (“NGO”) community (“HRW Proposal”). Part II also reviews the U.N. Draft Text (“Draft
Text”) on the creation of the Human Rights Council (“Council”). Part III of this Note argues that
the HRW Proposal best conceives of Commission reform vis-a`-vis the U.N. Principles. Part III
also proposes that, in restructuring the U.N. human rights system, Member States should consider
strengthening the role of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, and should explore
options for more consistent U.N. monitoring of investigative personnel worldwide.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of street children implicates a series of social and
legal challenges, including discrimination, drug abuse, mistreat-
ment, poverty, public health, and violence.1 The problem re-
mains especially acute in Central and Latin America, where ur-
ban streets and spaces double as homes for roughly forty million
children.2 Honduras, in particular, faces one of the most urgent
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law; Writing & Research
Editor, Volume XXX, Fordham International Law Journal; B.A., 2003, Barnard College of
Columbia University. The author sincerely thanks Professor Jeanmarie Fenrich, Re-
becca Kahan, Shane Kelbley, Rosa Morales, Kate Suvari, and Jesse Mockrin for their
assistance. The author also thanks her family and friends for their encouragement and
support.
1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WArCH [HRW], EASY TARGETS: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN
WORLDWIDE 14 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/children/chil-
dren.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (noting that street children face significant vio-
lence at hands of authorities more than other children; that street children are some-
times tortured and killed; and that street children are easy targets for violence because
they are often impoverished and do not know their rights); see also Selina Kossen, Five
Murdered Street Children in Guatemala: A Precedent Before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. BR. 11, 11 (1999) (stating that street children often come from
unstable and impoverished families and suffer from malnutrition, drug abuse, and hun-
ger); Timothy J. Treanor, Note, Relief for Mandela's Children: Street Children and the Law
in the New South Africa, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 883, 883 (1994) (describing how street
children's problems are similar throughout world, including arbitrary murder, begging,
depression, drug dealing, glue sniffing, homelessness, hunger, illness, malnutrition,
physical abuse, and sexual abuse).
2. See Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Pa-
rameters, 4 WHIrrTIERJ. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 323, 325 (2005) (citing UNICEF estimates
that there are approximately 100 million street children throughout world, with forty
million in Latin America); see also Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adop-
tion Reflect Human Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT'L L.
179, 184 (2003) (mentioning Honduran non-governmental organization ("NGO") esti-
mates that there are approximately forty million street children in Latin America);
Marc D. Seitles, Effect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child upon Street Children in Latin
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of these situations, with roughly twenty thousand homeless chil-
dren throughout the country.3
Although the Honduran Government has attempted to
eradicate the mistreatment of street children by implementing
protective legislative measures, limited legal remedies exist to
provide redress for street children and their families, and legisla-
tion remains poorly enforced.4 Human rights organizations cite
cases in which Honduran law enforcement authorities have been
responsible for arbitrary violence against street children.5 Law
enforcement authorities have been accused of assaulting street
children, forcing them to vacate certain areas, and stealing from
them.6 Certain accounts allege that Honduran police officers
America: A Study of Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala, 16 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 159, 159
(1998) (observing that there are approximately forty million street children in Latin
America); Susan O'Rourke von Struensee, Violence, Exploitation And Children: Highlights
of the United Nations Children's Convention And International Response To Children's Human
Rights, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 589, 616 (1995) (citing UNICEF statistics that
estimate forty million street children in Latin America).
3. See U.S. Dep't of State [State Department], County Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices-2003, (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27903.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (noting that Honduran Government and children's rights
NGOs estimate roughly twenty thousand street children in Honduras); see also Sara Sil-
ver, Effort to Rescue Street Children Boosted, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 2003, at 6 (ex-
plaining Honduran State's efforts to rescue country's twenty thousand street children);
Fergal Keane, Honduras's Child Killings, BBC NEWS, Oct. 5 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/programmes/fromourowncorrespondent/2300217.stm (estimating that there
are roughly twenty thousand street children in Honduras).
4. See Silver, supra note 3 (remarking on Honduras' efforts to rescue street chil-
dren through drug rehabilitation); see also Will Weissert, Glue Addiction a Plague on Hon-
duran Streets, CHI. T~iB.,July 20, 2000, at C8 (discussing Honduran laws which outlawed
glue sales and mandated use of mustard compound in glue in order to induce vomiting
upon inhalation; discussing lack of enforcement of legislation).
5. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights ("Com-
mission"), Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. AsmaJahangir, 73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2003/3/Add.2 (June 14, 2002) [hereinafter Jahangir Report] (stating that research
conducted by former United Nations ("U.N.") Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions ("Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions")
Asma Jahangir during her visit to Honduras makes it extremely clear that Honduran
security forces have killed children); see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 326 (citing State
Department reports which note that Honduran street children are often tortured and
killed by police officers); Annette Lopez, Comment, Creating Hope for Child Victims of
Domestic Violence in Political Asylum Law, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 603, 609 (2004)
(discussing U.S. court case that cited State Department reports on Honduran police
murdering street children in order to establish that Honduran child had well-founded
fear of persecution).
6. See Dan Brennan, Law: What They Need is a Lawyer, INDEP. (London), Sept. 14,
1999, at 14 (observing that street children flee abandonment, poverty, and sexual abuse
and often face theft from, among others, police officers); see alsoJuanita Darling, Hon-
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have used torture tactics to punish street children, including
electrocution, mutilation, and rape.7 Consequently, there is a
widespread belief that the Honduran police officers have con-
tributed, in part, to certain deaths.'
Not only are Honduran street children subject to arbitrary
acts of violence, but they are also victimized by a campaign of
extrajudicial executions,' which are defined as unlawful and in-
tentional murders committed either by agents of a State or with
their collusion or assent."0 The Latin American human rights
organization Casa Alianza reports that thousands of Honduran
children, some of whom lived entirely in the streets, have been
duras Faces a Flood of Street Kids, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 12, 1998, at DI (describing
one street child's account of police brutality).
7. See Michael Neumann, Anti-Semitism; A Minor Problem, Overblown, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2003, at M1 (referring to March 2003 BBC report which noted that Honduran
Government was initiating investigations of 1569 murdered street children; quoting
Amnesty International as stating that killers might be police officers and there have
been few prosecutions); see, e.g., Nation Briefs, NEWSDAY, Aug. 17, 2001, at A22 (reporting
that police and private security agents have murdered significant number of Honduran
street children in recent years); Duncan Campbell, Police 'Dispose' of Honduran Street
Kids, GUARDIAN (London), June 30, 2000, at 13 (discussing Honduran police officers as
responsible for murders of Honduran street children); Peter Paterson, Children of De-
spair; Review, DAILY MAIL, Dec. 9, 1997, at 49 (reviewing television documentary and
mentioning accounts of Guatemalan and Honduran police electrocuting, eye-gouging,
mutilating, and raping street children).
8. See Kevin Sullivan, Street Killings Aim at Honduran Youths; Gang Members Targeted in
Grisly Cycle, WASH. POST, May 18, 2003, at A14 (stating that Honduran Government has
admitted that some street children murders can be attributed to police officers); see also
The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of eighth-grader Edwin L.
Munoz) [hereinafter Munoz Testimony] (testifying that he had heard that gangs and
law enforcement authorities had killed street children).
9. SeeJahangir Report, supra note 5, at 73 (concluding that Honduran security
forces have extrajudicially executed children); see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 326 (dis-
cussing State Department reports which allege that Honduran children have been tor-
tured and killed by police officers).
10. See AMNESTY INT'L, HONDURAS ZERO TOLERANCE ... FOR IMPUNITY. EXTRAJUDI-
CIAL EXECUTIONS OF CHILDREN AND YOUTHS SINCE 1998 10 (2003) [hereinafter Extrajudi-
cial Executions], available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR370012003ENG
LISH/$File/AMR3700103.pdf (defining extrajudicial executions as "illegitimate and
deliberate murders either perpetrated by State agents or with their collusion or con-
sent"); see also In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
172 (holding that human rights violations, though not directly committed by Govern-
ment, can trigger State liability where State exhibits lack of diligence in preventing and
investigating violation); Edy Kaufman & Patricia Weiss Fagen, Extrajudicial Executions:
An Insight into the Global Dimensions of a Human Rights Violation, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 81, 81
(1981) (providing history of practice of extrajudicial execution and discussing its use to
manipulate political power).
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brutally murdered in recent years.' 1 Former United Nations
("U.N.") Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbi-
trary Executions ("Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Execu-
tions") AsmaJahangir has noted that Honduran children suffer
from one of the world's highest rates of arbitrary murder at the
hands of national security forces. 2 The Honduran State's ef-
forts to investigate these cases, however, remain weak."3
11. See 41% de Muertes dejovenes Son Ejecuciones [41% of Deaths of Minors Are Ex-
ecutions], ANSA NOTICIERO EN ESPAIfOL, Oct. 22, 2005 [hereinafter 41 % of Deaths]
(noting that, during first three quarters of 2005, Casa Alianza estimated that 124 chil-
dren and 204 young people between ages of eighteen and twenty-three were found with
bullet holes in neck and hands and legs tied, abandoned outside Honduran cities); see
also ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, La Violencia y Su Impacto Sobre La Nifiez y
Juventud Hondurea [Violence and Its Impact on Honduran Children and Youths], at 1,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/NGO/326 (2005) [hereinafter Violence and its Impact] (stating
that during period of 1998 to 2004, Casa Alianza registered 2520 violent deaths of mi-
nors under age of twenty-three in Honduras); Juan Jose Dalton, Mas De Dos Mil Ninos De
la Calle Asesinados En Honduras; Casa Alianza Insiste En La Necesidad De Investigar La Rela-
cion De La Policia Con Las Muertes [More Than 2000 Street Children Murdered in Hon-
duras; Casa Alianza Insists on the Necessity of Investigating the Relationship Between
the Police and the Deaths], LA OPINION (Los Angeles), Dec. 21, 2003 (quoting, accord-
ing to Casa Alianza statistics that during period of January 1998 to roughly December
2003, Casa Alianza documented 2089 murders of children and young people under age
twenty-three; noting that, at press time, political unit in charge of investigations had
only assigned 103 cases, of which twenty-three had been investigated); Nifios de la Calle
Piden Fin a Asesinatos y Castigo a Culpables [Children of the Street Seek End to Murders
and Punishment for Those Guilty], EFE NEWS SERVS., Dec. 10, 2003 [hereinafter End to
Murders] (mentioning that between 1998 and 2003, Casa Alianza registered approxi-
mately 2089 assassinations of Honduran minors, many of whose cases have not been
resolved); Denuncian Asesinatos y Torturas de Nifios de la Calle [Murders nd Torture of
Street Children Denounced], EFE NEWS SERvs., June 25, 1999 [hereinafter Murders and
Torture] (quoting Casa Alianza statistics that fifteen street children were killed in last
three years and another sixty were victims of torture and violence by police and individ-
uals).
12. See Letta Tayler, Victims of Honduras' Gang War; Students, Non-Gang Members Also
Being Killed, Activists Say, NEWSDAY, Dec. 7, 2003, at A25 (referring to U.N. estimates
that, in Honduras, youth murders by security agents are among highest in world); see
also U.N. Investigator Reports Street Children Slayings, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 17, 2001, at 23
[hereinafter U.N. Investigator] (noting that U.N. Special Rapporteur AsmaJahangir esti-
mates that rate of extrajudicial executions committed by security forces remains among
highest in world).
13. See Manuel Bermtidez, Maras, Sintoma Ersistente, INTER PRESS SER.-SPANISH,
Sept. 6, 2005 (quoting one lawyer as saying that, since 1998, Casa Alianza has been
investigating series of murders of minors under age twenty-three; stating that as of
roughly July 2005, 2778 deaths had been counted, most of which were gang-related;
noting lack of investigation and lack of interest of authorities creates impunity; stating,
however, that no evidence exists showing direct State participation in these murders);
see also Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems, 11 HUM. RTs. BR. 28, 29 (2003)
(describing weak judicial institutions in Honduras and high rate of impunity, particu-
larly with respect to investigation of extrajudicial executions); Jahangir Report, supra
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The United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention
and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Execu-
tions ("U.N. Principles") suggest comprehensive standards for
neutral, thorough, and timely investigations into all cases of sus-
pected extrajudicial execution and arbitrary murder. 4 In partic-
ular, the U.N. Principles provide that the purpose of criminal
investigations shall be to determine the details surrounding all
extrajudicially executed individuals and any possible patterns in
the murders in order to bring the perpetrators tojustice.15 The
Honduran State, however, falls short of meeting these stan-
dards. 6 Moreover, States throughout the world remain similarly
ill-equipped to effectively implement the U.N. Principles. 7
note 5, 56-62 (commenting that there have not been significant convictions, investi-
gations, or trials in cases of extrajudicial executions of street children).
14. See ECOSOC Res. 1989/65, Annex, 1989 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 52, U.N.
Doc. E/1989/89 [hereinafter U.N. Principles], available at http://www.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/i7pepi.htm (stating that there shall be impartial, thorough, and
prompt investigations of all extrajudicial executions, facilitated through government
offices and standardized procedures); see also Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Com-
patibility and the International Criminal Court, 11 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 17-18 (2001)
(explaining U.N. Principles' provision that Governments shall either bring perpetrators
to justice or extradite them to countries that will do so).
15. See U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 9 (providing for impartial, prompt, and
thorough investigations of all extrajudicial executions, through physical collection of
evidence and autopsy, to ascertain time of death and perpetrator); see also Kenneth
Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemparary Armed
Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2004) (describing U.N. Principles as providing gui-
dance on evidence preservation and autopsy procedures and arguing that this, in turn,
promotes accountability).
16. See Rachel Harvey, Children's Legal Centre, From Paper to Practice: An Analysis of
the Juvenile Justice System in Honduras, at 72 (2005) (estimating that, among 384 cases of
extrajudicial executions of Honduran street children during period of July 2003 to May
2004, agency responsible for investigating these deaths has sent only seventy-five cases
(involving 116 victims) to Office of Public Prosecutor); see also Wendy Carolina Funes,
Paralizada 60% de Investigaciones [Sixty Percent of Investigations Paralyzed], EL HER-
ALDO (Hond.), July 2, 2004 (on file with author) (approximating that sixty percent of
investigations were held up in early 2004 due to financial crisis affecting investigative
police).
17. See ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip
Alston, 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7 (Dec. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Alston Report]
(noting that urgency is always involved in cases of extrajudicial executions and, never-
theless, accountability measures established by governments in response rarely produce
effective results); see also Elizabeth Knight, Facing the Past: Retrospective Justice as a Means
to Promote Democracy in Nigeria, 35 CONN. L. REv. 867, 900 (2003) (stating that, in Nige-
ria, slow progress of trials of police who allegedly committed extrajudicial executions
has resulted in criticism of Nigerian judicial process as ineffective); Wasana Punyasena,
The Facade of Accountability: Disappearances in Sri Lanka, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 115,
158 (2003) (mentioning need for effective prevention and investigation of disappear-
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This Note uses the case of Honduran street children to
demonstrate that the U.N. Principles have not been adequately
implemented, and argues that the international community
should use the creation of the U.N. Human Rights Council
("Council") as an opportunity to insist on better training and
monitoring of investigative personnel worldwide. Part I reviews
the legal standards establishing extrajudicial executions of street
children as a major human rights violation and the Honduran
State's duty to investigate. Part I also examines challenges facing
Honduran investigative police agencies, including budget crises
and accusations of corruption and complicity. Part I concludes
with a review of the structure and function of the U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights ("Commission") and the investigative
standards set forth in the U.N. Principles.
Part II of this Note discusses competing frameworks for
Commission reform, focusing on the proposal of the High Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change ("High Level Panel
Proposal"), the proposal of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
("Report of Secretary-General"), and the proposal of Human
Rights Watch ("HRW") and the international human rights non-
governmental organization ("NGO") community ("HRW Propo-
sal"). Part II also reviews the U.N. Draft Text ("Draft Text") on
the creation of the Human Rights Council ("Council"). Part III
of this Note argues that the HRW Proposal best conceives of
Commission reform vis-;t-vis the U.N. Principles. Part III also
proposes that, in restructuring the U.N. human rights system,
Member States should consider strengthening the role of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, and should ex-
plore options for more consistent U.N. monitoring of investiga-
tive personnel worldwide.
ances; stating that only increasing accountability and providing justice will end cycle of
disappearances); Amnesty Int'l, Burkina Faso: Amnesty International Calls for an Investiga-
tion into Massive Extrajudicial Executions (Feb. 6, 2002), http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGAFR600012002?open&of=ENG-BFA (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (arguing
that Burkina Faso should immediately investigate allegations of 106 extrajudicial execu-
tions); HRW, Buying the Evidence: The Botched Investigation Into a Mass Grave in Chechnya
(May 2001), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/chechnya2/index.htm#TopOfPage
(last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (mentioning Russia's duty, under international human
rights law, to effectively investigate allegations of torture and extrajudicial executions,
and noting Russia's weak efforts in light of U.N. Principles).
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I. THE INVESTIGATION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS OF
HONDURAN STREET CHILDREN
Casa Alianza reports that thousands of Honduran children,
both homeless and with shelter, have been extrajudicially exe-
cuted in recent years by unknown perpetrators and by Hondu-
ran police officers.18 Various non-State actors also have been as-
sociated with extrajudicial executions of these street children in
Honduras, including gang members, ordinary civilians, security
forces, and unknown individuals.19 Little accountability for ex-
trajudicial executions has been imposed by the Honduran judici-
ary, prompting civilians, in the past, to organize illegal armed
groups in order to target homeless children or gang-affiliated
youths.2" Although no direct evidence links any of these
murders to the Honduran State, weak investigative efforts often
permit the perpetrators to escape punishment.21
Most seriously, witnesses in Honduras have also provided
18. See 41% of Deaths, supra note 11 (commenting that, during first three quarters
of 2005, Casa Alianza estimated that 124 children and 204 youths between ages of eigh-
teen and twenty-three were found outside Honduran cities, with bullet holes in neck
and hands and legs tied); see also Violence and its Impact, supra note 11, at 1 (finding that
during period of 1998 to 2004, Casa Alianza registered 2520 violent deaths of Hondu-
ran minors under age of twenty-three); Murders and Torture, supra note 11 (referring to
Casa Alianza statistics which state that fifteen street children were assassinated in Hon-
duras during approximate period from 1996 to 1999, with another sixty victimized by
violence and torture).
19. See Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 8-12 (describing different causes of
extrajudicial executions of children as unknown "death cars," gangs, individuals, police,
private guards, and security committees); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 69 (observing
that, among 574 murders recorded during period of 1998 to September 2001, 54.9% of
murders were committed by unknown individuals and 4.2% of murders were commit-
ted by law enforcement officials).
20. See 41 % of Deaths, supra note 11 (reporting that Honduran Minister of Security
has admitted that illegal armed bands were organized by civilians to engage in social
cleansing, due, in part, to impunity for perpetrators); see also Tim Weiner, Outside Ex-
perts Find Cover-Up of Killings in Honduras Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at Al (citing
State Department report which suggested that Honduran death squads formed by
members of community, police, and vigilante groups were responsible for killing sus-
pected criminals, often teenagers).
21. See Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems, supra note 13, at 29 (describ-
ing weak judicial enforcement and impunity in Honduras, particularly with respect to
investigation of extrajudicial executions); see alsoJahangir Report, supra note 5, 56-
62 (observing poor record of Honduran investigations and convictions into deaths of
street children); Manuel Bermtldez, Death Squads Prey on Gang Members Deported by U.S.,
INrER PRESS SERV., Sept. 6, 2005 (mentioning that perpetrators of extrajudicial execu-
tions often escape punishment and underscoring that no evidence exists directly link-
ing extrajudicial executions to Honduran State).
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descriptive accounts of Honduran investigative police officers di-
rectly participating in murders of children.22 Human rights or-
ganizations estimate that Honduran police officers are responsi-
ble for a considerable percentage of the country's reported ex-
trajudicial executions.23 Moreover, Honduran police agencies
have been cited by both the U.N. and the United States for their
alleged involvement in extrajudicial executions. 24 Although cer-
tain cases have resulted in successful prosecutions and convic-
tions of security forces, arbitrary murders nevertheless con-
tinue.25
22. SeeJahangir Report, supra note 5, 1 73 (finding evidence that security forces
have killed children in Honduras); see also Jan McGirk, Honduras Investigates Murders of
1,300 Street Children, INDEP. (London), Sept. 4, 2002 (discussing Inter-American Court
of Human Rights' ("IACHR") examination of case of fifteen-year-old Oscar Daniel Me-
dina Cortes and fourteen-year-old Jose Luis Hernandez, murdered and, according to
witnesses, allegedly abducted by Direcci6n General de Investigaci6n Criminal
("DGIC")); Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 17 (explaining cases of Medina and
Hernandez, who were found tortured and murdered, allegedly by DGIC); Harvey, supra
note 16, at 69 (noting that, among 574 murders recorded during period of 1998 to
September 2001, 54.9% of murders were committed by unknown individuals and 4.2%
percent of murders were committed by law enforcement officials).
23. SeeJos6 Pablo CallejaJim~nez et al., Conociendo a la Infancia Que Vive en la Calle
100 (Escuela Universitaria de Trabajo Social de Gij6n, Dec. 2004), available at http://
www.casa-alianza.org/files/libro-los-ninos.pdf (noting Casa Alianza's opinion that con-
siderable percentage of deaths of street children can be attributed to social cleansing by
individuals and members of security forces; affirming that police are behind roughly
twenty-five percent of murders in Honduras, whereas Honduran State only recognizes
roughly one percent of cases); see also 41 % of Deaths, supra note 11 (observing that,
according to one study by Honduran NGO Centro de Prevenci6n, Tratamiento y
Rehabilitaci6n de Vfctimas de la Tortura ("CPTRVT"), roughly twenty-two percent of
murders of young people and minors in country were committed by police officers, by
means of unnecessary force, or use of death squads).
24. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, STATE DEPARTMENT,
HONDURAS: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcrICEs-2004 (Feb. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter State Department Report], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2004/41765.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005) (noting Honduras' general respect
for human rights, but noting that members of police have committed extrajudicial ex-
ecutions); see alsoJahangir Report, supra note 5, 73 (stating that research conducted
by former Special Rapporteur Asma Jahangir during her visit to Honduras makes it
extremely clear that security forces have killed street children in Honduras); Wardle,
supra note 2, at 326 (citing U.S. Department of State reports which noted that Hondu-
ran street children are often tortured and killed by police officers); Lopez, supra note 5,
at 610 (discussing cases in which U.S. courts cited U.S. Department of State reports on
Honduran police murdering street children).
25. See Harvey, supra note 16, at 72 (explaining that among 384 cases of extrajudi-
cial executions of Honduran street children during period of July 2003 to May 2004,
agency responsible for investigating these deaths has sent only seventy-five cases (involv-
ing 116 victims) to Office of Public Prosecutor); see also State Department Report, supra
note 24 (referring to Ministry of Public Security statistics and stating that, generally
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A. Legal Standards Regarding Street Children
Both Honduran and international legal standards establish
that the arbitrary murder of street children is a serious human
rights violation.2 6 The C6digo de la Nifez y la Adolescencia ("Chil-
dren's Code") is the primary legislation governing children's
rights in Honduras.2" This domestic legislation guarantees Hon-
duran children the right to life from the moment of conception
and imposes upon the Honduran State an affirmative obligation
to adopt necessary measures to protect this right.2" Moreover,
the Children's Code binds the Honduran State to accommodate
at-risk children's special needs.29 Extrajudicial executions of
street children violate the Honduran Children's Code.3 °
speaking, in 2004, Honduras continued to have high homicide rate with low rate of case
closure); 41% of Deaths, supra note 11 (noting Casa Alianza reports of murdered Hon-
duran children and youth, found outside urban areas with hands and legs bound, shot
in back of neck); Violence and its Impact, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that during period of
1998 to 2004, Casa Alianza registered 2520 violent deaths of Honduran minors under
age of twenty-three).
26. See Decree No. 73-96, 5 Sept. 1996, C6d. de la Nifiez y la Adolencia [Children's
Code] tit. II, ch. II, art. 12, La Gaceta [L.G.] Sept. 5, 1996 (providing that every human
being has right to life from moment of conception and that Honduran State shall pro-
tect this right through adoption of necessary measures); see also Organization of Ameri-
can States, American Convention on Human Rights arts. 4, 5, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] (guaranteeing right to
be free from torture and cruel or degrading punishment or treatment; granting right to
life to every person from moment of conception); Harvey, supra note 16, at 3-4 (discuss-
ing history and drafting of Children's Code); Katharine Shirey, The Duty to Compensate
Victims of Torture Under Customary International Law, 14 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 30, 34 (2004)
(explaining American Convention's prohibition against torture in Article 5 and
IACHR's proclivity for awarding damages under this provision).
27. See Decree No. 73-96, 5 Sept. 1996, C6d. de la Nifiez y la Adolencia [Children's
Code] tit. II, ch. I, art. 11, L.G. Sept. 5, 1996 (granting children general rights to cul-
ture, dignity, education, environment, expression, family, free time, health, identity,
life, personal liberty, social security, and sports); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 3-4
(discussing history and drafting of Children's Code).
28. See Decree No. 73-96, 5 Sept. 1996, C6d. de la Nifiez y la Adolencia [Children's
Code] tit. II, ch. II, art. 12, L.G. Sept. 5, 1996 (stating that every human being has right
to life from moment of conception); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 3-4 (explaining
general provisions of Children's Code).
29. See Decree No. 73-96, 5 Sept. 1996, C6d. de la Nifiez y la Adolencia [Children's
Code] tit. II, ch. I, art. 150, L.G. Sept. 5, 1996 (noting ways in which at-risk or aban-
doned children will be protected by Honduran State); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at
3-4 (discussing salient features of Children's Code).
30. See Richard J. Wilson, The Index of Individual Case Reports of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights: 1994-1999, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 353, 419-20 (2001)
(discussing IACHR case in which IACHR found that extrajudicial executions constitute
violation of right to life); see also Kara E. Irwin, Comment, Prospects for Justice: The Proce-
dural Aspect of the Right to Life Under the European Convention on Human Rights and its
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Similarly, extrajudicial executions of street children violate
international law."1 The American Convention on Human
Rights ("American Convention"), which Honduras ratified on
September 8, 1977, protects individuals, including children,
from torture and arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.12 Ac-
cording to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
("IACHR"), when a right enumerated in the American Conven-
tion is violated, a duty on the part of States arises to investigate
the violation.33
A case involving forced disappearances in Honduras illus-
trates the idea that States incur liability for failing to investigate
human rights violations.34  In In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, the
Applications to Investigations of Northern Ireland's Bloody Sunday, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1822, 1858-59, n.98 (1999) (concluding that extrajudicial execution is violation of right
to life); United Nations Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 11, at 3, published in United Nations
Centre for Human Rights, United Nations Reference Guide in the Field of Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/6, available at www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/
docs/fsll.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) (referring to arbitrary execution as violation of
right to life).
31. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing that every human being has inherent
right to life); see also Marjorie Cohn, Human Rights: Casualty of the War on Terror, 25 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 317, 329 (2003) (stating that extrajudicial executions violate ICCPR);
Glen Kelley, Note, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multinational
Corporations, 39 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 520-21 (2001) (stating that prohibition of
extrajudicial execution stands as human rights norm); U.N. Office of the High Comm'r
for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties
(June 1, 2004), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/Ratification-
Status.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2006) (noting that Honduras ratified ICCPR on Novem-
ber 25, 1997).
32. See American Convention, supra note 26, arts. 4, 5 (guaranteeing right to be
free from torture and granting right to life from moment of conception); see also In re
Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 11 (noting that Hon-
duras ratified American Convention on September 8, 1977 and accepts contentious
jurisdiction of IACHR); Shirey, supra note 26, at 34 (discussing American Convention's
prohibition against torture in Article 5 and Inter-American Court's decision to award
damages under this provision). But see Toni M. Fine, Moratorium 2000: An International
Dialogue Toward a Ban on Capital Punishment, 30 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 421, 425
(1999) (noting that American Convention provides exception to right to life for cases
of capital punishment).
33. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 194
(determining that Honduran State was liable for failing to appropriately investigate in-
dividuals that were forcibly disappeared); see also B.G. Ramcharan, The Role of Interna-
tional Bodies in the Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 Am. U. L. REv. 99, 114 (1983) (discussing
Commission's examination of concept of State liability for failure to investigate situa-
tion of missing persons in Chile and South Africa).
34. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 174
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IACHR found the Honduran State liable for forced disappear-
ances committed by non-State actors, because the Honduran
State had breached its duty under the American Convention to
use appropriate diligence in preventing such disappearances. 5
Under Velasquez-Rodriguez, violations of the American Conven-
tion committed by non-State actors can lead to State liability.36
The IACHR further established in Velasquez-Rodriguez that
the Honduran State has an affirmative duty to undertake mean-
ingful investigations of violations protected by the American
Convention, as well as to identify the individuals responsible for
the violations, impose an appropriate punishment, and provide
the victim with reasonable compensation.37 Pursuant to this
duty, the Honduran State must investigate, in an effective and
(finding that State of Honduras has legal duty to prevent human rights violations and,
should it fail to do so, to use appropriate diligence in carrying out serious investigation
to identify perpetrators and bring them to justice); see also Peter D. Trooboff, Decision:
Human Rights-Compliance of Honduras with American Convention-Exhaustion of Domestic
Legal Remedies, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 361-67 (1989) (summarizing Velasquez-Rodriguez
decision and noting that case represents fundamental contribution to evolving law of
international human rights); Int'l Council on Human Rights Pol'y, BEYOND VOLUNTA-
RISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COM-
PANIES 51-53, (2002) [hereinafter BEYOND VOLUNTARISM], available at http://www.clean-
clothes.org/ftp/beyond-voluntarism.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (discussing Velas-
quez-Rodriguez decision's imposition of obligation to use appropriate diligence in
investigating human rights violations, whether committed by private or public actors).
35. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 172
(finding that rights violation, although not directly imputable to State, can trigger State
liability if State fails to use due diligence in preventing violation as required by Ameri-
can Convention); see also Trooboff, supra note 34, at 361-67 (explaining Velasquez-Rodri-
guez decision and noting that case represents extremely important contribution to
human rights law because of its pragmatic treatment of forced disappearances); BEYOND
VOLUNTAIUSM, supra note 34, at 51-53 (noting Velasquez-Rodriguez decision's imposition
of obligation to use due diligence in investigating human rights violations, whether
committed by private or public actors).
36. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 172
(observing that acts committed by non-State actors can lead to State liability); see also
Trooboff, supra note 34, at 361-67 (describing Velasquez-Rodriguez decision and arguing
that IACHR appropriately imposed high standard of liability on Honduran State); BE-
YOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 34, at 51-53 (discussing Velasquez-Rodriguez decision's as-
signment of liability to State if it fails to use appropriate diligence in investigating
human rights violations, regardless of perpetrators).
37. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 174
(explaining States' duty to ensure victim adequate compensation under American Con-
vention); see alsoJon M. Van Dyke, The Fundamental Human Right to Prosecution and Com-
pensation, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 77, 82 (2001) (referring to Velasquez-Rodriguez's
finding that American Convention mandates that States provide victims with adequate
compensation).
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serious manner, every situation in which a right protected by the
American Convention has been violated.3" Furthermore, this
duty to investigate continues despite changes in political admin-
istration.39 Despite the clear obligations on the part of the Hon-
duran State to prevent and investigate, however, extrajudicial ex-
ecutions and forced disappearances continue, even in recent
years.4 °
The Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), as rati-
fied by Honduras, provides binding legal authority regarding ex-
trajudicial executions of Honduran children.4" The CRC obli-
gates signatory States to use all appropriate measures, including
legislative and administrative efforts, to implement children's
38. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 176-
77 (providing that Honduras has duty to investigate every situation involving violation
of right protected by American Convention and that Honduras fails to fulfill this duty if
violation goes unpunished; holding that in order to fulfill duty to investigate, Honduras
must undertake investigation in serious and effective manner, and that if Honduras
does not seriously investigate violations by private parties, Honduras is essentially aiding
such parties and exposing itself to State liability on international level); see also Kathe-
rine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to State Protection from Do-
mestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARv. INr'L L.J. 507, 549 (1993) (noting Velasquez-Rodri-
guez's imposition of State duty to investigate, prosecute, and punish rights violators).
39. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 184
(holding that duty to investigate continues despite changes in political administration,
even if attitude of new administration is more attentive to rights violated); see alsoJon
M. Van Dyke, Promoting Accountability for Human Rights Abuses, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 153, 177
n.49 (2005) (observing that duty to investigate continues without respect to changes in
political administration).
40. C.f Violence and its Impact, supra note 11, at 2 (finding that Honduran State
must conduct effective investigations in order to sanction perpetrators and that this
must be prioritized by Honduran State and international community, as impunity and
executions of minors continue); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Extrajudicial,
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye,
199-200, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.1 (1997) [hereinafter Ndiaye Report] (doc-
umenting three cases of threats against Honduran individuals that reported disappear-
ances of family members).
41. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 6, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC] (recognizing that every child has inherent right to life; requiring
States Parties to ensure survival and development of children); see also Consideration of
Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention, Periodic Reports of States
Parties Due in 1997, Addendum: Honduras, 1 1, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.2 (1998)
[hereinafter Periodic Report], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Sym-
bol)/da45f93d9492a8348025669cO04f6a9POpendocument (noting Honduras' date of
CRC ratification as September 9, 1990); Nancy Beyer, The Sex Tourism Industry Spreads to
Costa Rica and Honduras: Are These Countries Doing Enough to Protect Their Children from
Sexual Exploitation?, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 301, 323 (2001) (discussing history of
CRC and Honduras' ratification on September 9, 1990).
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rights.42 The CRC also imposes a duty upon States to ensure
children's basic living standards, to protect children from arbi-
trary attacks on honor and reputation, to protect children from
physical and mental violence, and to respect children's right to
life.4 3
The American Convention and the CRC speak to cases in-
volving the arbitrary murder of street children, which violate the
positive rights to life and basic living standards as well as the neg-
ative rights of being free from honor attacks, torture, and vio-
lence.4 4 Moreover, Article 16 of the Honduran Constitution
makes international agreements applicable to domestic legisla-
tion.4 5 Instances of extrajudicial executions of street children,
therefore, violate both Honduran and international legal stan-
dards, in addition to establishing a pattern of serious and urgent
human rights violations.4 6
42. See CRC, supra note 41, art. 4 (stating that States Parties must use all appropri-
ate administrative, legislative, and other measures in order to implement rights recog-
nized by CRC; noting that, with respect to cultural, economic, and social rights, States
shall undertake measures in accordance with their maximum available resources); see
also Maria Grahn-Farley, Foreword: Crossing Borders, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 657, 658 (2002)
(observing that CRC calls upon States, as well as individuals, to protect children's
rights).
43. See CRC, supra note 41, arts. 6, 7, 16, 19 (providing that every child has inher-
ent right to life; mandating that parties to CRC ensure that children are not subjected
to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prohibiting par-
ties to CRC from interfering with children's privacy and engaging in attacks on honor
and reputation; stating that parties to CRC must take all appropriate measures to pro-
tect children from violence); see also Rebeca Rios-Kohn, The Convention on the Rights of the
Child: Progress and Challenges, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 139, 142 (1998) (discuss-
ing CRC's provisions that protect children from exploitation and abuse).
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) (discussing concept of customary international law as set of
legal standards that result from general and consistent practices that States follow out of
sense of legal obligation); see also Connie de la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely
a Guiding Principle or Customary International Legal Right ?, 11 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 37,
45 (1994) (noting that CRC is source of customary international law). C.f Henry J.
Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS,
MoRALs 363-64 (2000) (drawing distinctions between positive rights, which are seen as
legal entitlements, and negative rights, which are seen as legal protections).
45. See Constituci6n de la Republica de Honduras [Cn.] [Constitution] tit. I, ch. II,
art. 16, Jan. 11, 1982, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Hondu-
ras/hond82.html (providing that international treaties become part of domestic law as
soon as they enter into force); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 2 (discussing Honduras
as monist system and incorporation of international treaties into domestic Honduran
legislation); Periodic Report, supra note 41, 2 (noting that CRC represents part of
domestic Honduran law and is therefore binding on Honduran State).
46. See Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Ef-
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B. Criminal Investigation in Honduras
The Direcci6n General de Investigacidn Criminal ("DGIC") is
the Honduran police unit responsible for investigating all crimi-
nal infractions.4" With respect to extrajudicial executions, the
DGIC has been implicated in the torture and murder of Hondu-
ran children, both homeless and with shelter.4 8 Moreover, evi-
dence shows that, in general, Honduran police officers have
solved only a small fraction of these cases.49
The Honduran police agencies, including the DGIC, have
been critiqued by the Honduran public as generally ineffec-
tive.5 ° Surveys of Honduran citizens indicate a general lack of
faith in the police, with concerns about corruption, filing of
cases, logistical support, and police training.5 Moreover, the
forts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 169, 185 (2004) (observing
that extrajudicial executions violate international law); see also Cohn, supra note 31, at
338 (discussing Special Rapporteur's observations that extrajudicial executions are un-
lawful, even in time of war).
47. See Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that function of crimi-
nal investigation in Honduras falls to DGIC); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 10 (stat-
ing that DGIC is responsible for investigating offenses and collecting evidence).
48. See McGirk, supra note 22 (discussing IACHR's examination of case of fifteen-
year-old Oscar Daniel Medina Cortes and fourteen-year-old Jose Luis Hernandez, mur-
dered and, according to witnesses, allegedly abducted by DGIC); see also Extrajudicial
Executions, supra note 10, at 17 (describing cases of Medina and Hernandez, who were
allegedly tortured and murdered by DGIC).
49. See Harvey, supra note 16, at 72 (discussing few number of extrajudicial execu-
tion cases that police are handling); see also Gustavo Palmieri, Wash. Office on Latin
America [WOLA], THEMES AND DEBATES IN PUBLIC SECURITY REFORM, A MANUAL FOR
CIVIL SOCIETY. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, available at http://www.wola.org/publica-
tions/pubsecuritythemesdebates criminalinvestigation.pdf (finding that roughly
thirty percent of homicides are solved in Honduras, compared with forty-five percent in
United States and arguing that improving criminal investigation techniques remains
challenging in many countries).
50. See Overseas Security Advisory Council, Honduras: 2005 Crime and Safety Report
(Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.ds-osac.org/Reports/report.cfm?contentlD=
26859 (last visited May 9, 2006) (explaining that despite training efforts on behalf of
other States, including United States, DGIC still remains unable to effectively prevent
crime); see also Leticia Salom6n, U.N. Dev. Program [UNDP], EL DESEMPEF4o POLICIAL Y
LA SATISFACCION DE LA CIUDADANIA 8, Feb. 2004 (stating that Honduran citizens tend to
believe that police do not effectively combat delinquency and that police system is in
need of modernization, particularly with respect to criminal investigation).
51. See Salom6n, supra note 50, at 27 (observing that, in response to question "Are
the Investigative Police Efficient?," forty-four percent of respondents considered investi-
gative police to be effective, compared with forty-five percent of respondents who an-
swered, "at times," and sixteen percent of respondents who answered "no"; stating that
respondents were concerned about corruption, logistical support, filing cases, and po-
lice training); see also Munoz Testimony, supra note 8 (providing testimony of eighth-
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DGIC has been criticized internationally for its limited capabili-
ties with respect to the investigation and prosecution of crimes
and its limited presence throughout the country.5 2 Although
there have been improvements with respect to the quality of
criminal investigations, some citizens still attribute the high rate
of crime in Honduras to the complacency of law enforcement
authorities.53
The Honduran DGIC also suffers from a severe lack of logis-
tical resources; it is widely recognized as poorly trained, un-
derfunded, and understaffed.5 4 Inadequate budgetary resources
directly affect the quality and efficacy of the criminal justice sys-
tem, and the DGIC has halted investigations due to fiscal crises
on more than one occasion in recent years. 55 Moreover, inequi-
table budgetary allocation leaves a disproportionately low per-
centage of DGIC funds devoted to substantive investigation:
ninety percent of the DGIC budget pays officers' wages and nine
percent supports investigative operations. 56 Massive budgetary
grader Edwin Munoz, who testified that he did not report domestic violence within his
family because he did not think police would protect him).
52. See State Department Issues Consular Information Sheet on Honduras, US FED NEWS,
Nov. 21, 2005 (mentioning Honduran law enforcement authorities' limited ability to
prevent and investigate crimes); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 10 (discussing limited
DGIC presence in Honduras).
53. See State Department Report, supra note 24 (concluding that although criminal
investigations improved in 2004, general public still believed that corrupt security
agents were complicit in crimes involving murders of children and minors); see also
Reconocen Que Policia Esta Infiltrada Por Delincuentes [Police Infiltrated by Delinquents],
EFE NEWS SERVS., June 21, 2002 [hereinafter Delinquents] (stating that DGIC is infil-
trated with criminals; noting that head of DGIC indicated that presence of delinquents
within DGIC has been confirmed).
54. See State Department Report, supra note 24 (noting that Honduran police, in-
cluding DGIC, were underfunded, undertrained, and understaffed, with corruption still
remaining serious problem); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 19 (mentioning insuffi-
cient funding of DGIC); 'Paralizada'DGIC Por Falta de Presupuesto [DGIC Paralyzed Due
to Lack of Budget], LA TRIBUNA (Los Angeles), Nov. 24, 2005 [hereinafter Lack of
Budget], available at http://www.latribuna.hn/2054.0.html (reporting that DGIC investi-
gations were nearly paralyzed in one area of Honduras, after budget expired); Wendy
Carolina Funes, Paralizada la DGIC Por Falta de Gasolina [DGIC Paralyzed Due to Gaso-
line Shortage], EL HERALDO (Hond.), June 21, 2004 [hereinafter Funes, Gasoline
Shortage] (discussing paralyzing impact of gasoline shortage on DGIC).
55. See Lack of Budget, supra note 54 (stating that Hondurans had donated supplies
without which investigations would have been nearly halted); see also Funes, supra note
16 (reporting police investigations were halted when DGIC experienced financial crisis
of nine million Honduran lempiras); Funes, Gasoline Shortage, supra note 54 (discussing
negative consequences of gasoline shortage on DGIC).
56. See Funes, supra note 16 (estimating that roughly ninety percent of DGIC
budget is used for payment of salaries while roughly nine percent is used for investiga-
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problems have a direct effect on impunity, creating discord be-
tween detectives and the Office of the Public Prosecutor.57 Yet,
despite the low turnover in successful case resolution, DGIC in-
vestigations remain absolutely critical to the criminal justice sys-
tem. 8
Apart from budgetary problems, bias often taints DGIC in-
vestigations. 9 Members of the DGIC and Honduran police of-
ficers have been generally criticized for their involvement in cor-
rupt practices.6" Certain DGIC agents, moreover, have been sus-
pended for more serious offenses, including abuse of power,
attempted homicide, collaboration with organized crime, and
tive operations); see also Beyer, supra note 41, at 321 (stating that Honduran police
officers receive average income of roughly $1000 per year).
57. See Funes, supra note 16 (observing that sixty percent of investigations were
paralyzed due to financial crisis in 2004; noting that this caused serious degree of impu-
nity; stating difficulties coordinating with Office of Public Prosecutor; noting that
courts cannot act without complete investigations); see also Douglass Cassel, Lessons From
the Americas: Guidelines for International Response To Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 197, 199 (1996) (explaining de facto and dejure blanket of impunity that
exists throughout Latin America in context of undertraining and underfunding of po-
lice, prosecutors, and judges, as well as extremely inadequate budgets, antiquated and
ineffective criminal procedures, pervasive corruption, and politicized leadership).
58. See Funes, supra note 16 (reporting that, were DGIC to collapse, there would be
serious repercussions because Office of Public Prosecutor would be unable to try
criminals; stating that, of total pending denunciations, twenty percent are being dili-
gently investigated; noting that situation is not new); see also Harvey, supra note 16, at 19
(referring to 2003 Prosecutor's Office report which identified two major problems fac-
ing criminal justice system as poor quality of investigations and DGIC inefficiency); Ex-
trajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 16 (stating that shortcomings in DGIC's investiga-
tive functions prevent Office of Public Prosecutor from fully prosecuting and punishing
criminals).
59. See State Department Report, supra note 24 (noting that despite improvements
in criminal investigations during 2004, public at large continued to harbor belief that
security personnel were partly to blame for high crime rate; underscoring particular
problem of murders of children and minors); see also Delinquents, supra note 53 (stating
that head of DGIC admitted that DGIC is infiltrated with criminals); Extrajudicial Execu-
tions, supra note 10, at 15 (noting that investigative functions may have lost impartiality,
influenced by corruption and partisan political considerations).
60. See State Department Report, supra note 24 (estimating that, during period
from 2000 through August 2004, 186 police were prosecuted and 1344 were fired for
either incompetence or corruption); see also Wendy Carolina Funes, Con Baja Deshonrosa
56 Agentes de la DGIC [With Dishonorable Discharge of Fifty-Six DGIC Agents], EL HER-
ALDO (Hond.), July 6, 2005 [hereinafter Dishonorable Discharge] (stating that, from 2002
to 2005, fifty-six agents were removed and thirteen were, at time of publication, cur-
rently suspended with criminal charges pending). But see id. (reporting that, in 2003,
twenty-nine agents resigned, compared with twenty in 2004 and only seven as of mid-
2005).
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damages to third parties.61
Moreover, the DGIC often fails to adequately investigate
cases of extrajudicial executions.62 In such cases, the DGIC
often only files a por cuanto--a basic document establishing that
a violent death has occurred and that an investigative file should
be opened.63 In response to many instances of extrajudicial ex-
ecutions, the DGIC does not file a por cuanto and, instead, de-
votes minimal effort to investigating the case.64 Commentators
suggest that the DGIC has also been involved in certain instances
of extrajudicial executions.65
61. See Dishonorable Discharge, supra note 60 (reporting thirteen suspended agents
and detectives face criminal proceedings because of abuse of office, attempted homi-
cide, collaboration with organized crime, or injuries and damages to third parties); see
also Policias de Dia, Ladrones de Noche [Police Officers By Day, Theives By Night], EL
HERALDO (Hond.), Mar. 3, 2005 (mentioning that two DGIC officials were cited for
their alleged involvement with dangerous criminal organization that intercepts and as-
saults van drivers).
62. See Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 15-16 (noting instances in which
DGIC inadequately investigates instances of extrajudicial executions); see also MARK UN-
GAR, LA MANO DuRA: CURRENT DILEMMAS IN LATIN AMERICAN POLICE REFORM 6 (2004),
http://www.newschool.edu/gf/centers/aney/confO4_Mark-Ungar.pdf (last visited
May 12, 2006) (discussing poor overall quality of DGIC investigations and stating that
unless criminals are literally caught in act, there is little chance that crimes will be
resolved).
63. See Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 15-16 (explaining that, with respect
to DGIC, in most cases of extrajudicial executions, por cuanto document is only filed to
indicate that violent death has taken place, which should lead to opening of file but
rarely does); see also Centro de Prevenci6n Tratamiento y Rehabilitaci6n de las Vfctimas
de la Tortura y sus Familiares [CPTRT], Estudio de Casos de Policfas Denunciados por
Homicidio en Juzgados de Tegucigalpa y Comayaguela, at 24 [hereinafter CPTRT Report],
available at http://www.cptrt.org/pdf/Estudio%20de%2Casos%20de%2OPolicias%20
Denunciados%20por%2OHomicidio.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) (reporting that, in
case of Rony Ricardo Padilla Sierra, allegedly murdered by DGIC agent Mario Men-
doza, only evidence documenting death is por cuanto document).
64. See, e.g., Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 16 (stating that in many cases,
por cuanto document is not even filed; stating that in other cases, investigation is alto-
gether inadequate, with low levels of prosecution and sentencing); Bermildez, supra
note 13 (discussing one lawyer's comment that, since 1998, Casa Alianza has been inves-
tigating series of murders of minors under age twenty-three; stating that as of roughly
July 2005, 2778 deaths had been counted, most of which were gang-related; noting lack
of investigation and lack of interest of authorities have created impunity; stating, how-
ever, that no evidence exists showing direct State participation in these murders);
Jahangir Report, supra note 5, 56-62 (concluding that there have been insufficient
investigations in cases of extrajudicial executions of children).
65. See CPTRT Report, supra note 63, at 3 (describing cases in which violent deaths
were attributed to police); see also Implican a Policias en 22 Por Ciento de MuertesJovenes y
Ninos [Police Implicated in Twenty-Two Percent of Deaths of Children and Youths],
EFE NEws SERVS., Mar. 29, 2004 (providing Honduran NGO CPTRT's conclusions that
Honduran police have been complicit in many murders of children); McGirk, supra
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Another Honduran institution that focuses on investigating
the deaths of children is the Unidad Especial de Tratamiento de
Muerte de Menores, or Special Unit to Examine Children's
Deaths ("Special Unit")66 The Special Unit was established by
former President Ricardo Maduro67 in September 2002 and is
comprised of five DGIC agents, initially committed to investigat-
ing and resolving, within a ninety-day period, cases involving the
arbitrary murder of children. 6 The Special Unit investigates
cases primarily involving children or youths found with bullet
wounds to the head, with mutilated bodies, or outside urban ar-
eas. 
6 9
note 22 (explaining IACHR's examination of two cases of murdered youths, allegedly
abducted by DGIC); Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 17 (describing cases of
Medina and Hernandez, who were found tortured and murdered, allegedly by DGIC);
Tayler, supra note 12 (referring to U.N. estimates that, in Honduras, murders of youths
by security agents are among highest in world); CoMrrt DE FAmtILARES DE DETENIDOS
DESAPARECIDOS EN HONDURAS [COFADEH], HONDURAS: SITUACI6N DE DERECHOS HuMA-
NOS 2002 27 (2002), http://portal.rds.org.hn/download.php?id=470 (mentioning that
Special Rapporteur indicated that there have been several cases of minors executed by
security forces; stating that, in response, Public Ministry presented forensic report on
extrajudicial executions, explaining that most serious problems were slowness and indif-
ference of justice system, inefficiency of DGIC, and frequent contamination of crime
scenes); U.N. Investigator, supra note 12 (referring to former Special Rapporteur Asma
Jahangir's estimates that rate of extrajudicial executions committed by Honduran secur-
ity forces remains among highest in world).
66. See Harvey, supra note 16, at 70-71 (reporting that Unidad Especial de
Tratamiento de Muerte de Menores ("Special Unit") was created to investigate violent
deaths of children which occurred from 1998 to present); see also Extrajudicial Executions,
supra note 10, at 20 (noting that Honduran Government created Special Unit to specifi-
cally investigate extrajudicial executions of street children).
67. See Harvey, supra note 16, at 70-71 (stating that Special Unit was created in
response to urging of Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions); see also Extraju-
dicial Executions, supra note 10, at 20 (remarking that Ricardo Maduro's urging caused
Ministry of Security to create Special Unit).
68. See Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10, at 20 (stating that Special Unit was
established under administration of President Ricardo Maduro; stating that Special
Unit was initially committed to investigating and resolving, within ninety-day period,
fifteen cases of murdered children and youth, documented by Casa Alianza); see also
Police Unit Set Up to Probe Youth Murders, WORLD MKTS. ANALVsis, Sept. 11, 2002 (explain-
ing that, responding to international pressure, government of Ricardo Maduro set up
Special Unit to combat high level of murdered children and youth in Honduras; noting
that DGIC detectives would comprise Special Unit).
69. See Harvey, supra note 16, at 71 (stating that Special Unit is authorized to inves-
tigate cases in which children or youths are found with bullet wounds to head, with
mutilated bodies, or outside urban areas); see also Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 10,
at 20 (noting that Special Unit is responsible for investigating deaths of extrajudicial
executions of children and minors, as well as for determining causes of deaths and
establishing identities of those responsible).
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Since the establishment of the Special Unit, the prosecution
rate of children and youth murders has risen.70 However, the
Special Unit has only been able to address a fraction of the cases
that it has received.7 ' Extrajudicial executions of children and
minors continually occur, with a number of cases reported in the
last two years. 72 For this reason, international human rights or-
ganizations still urge additional efforts on the part of the Hon-
duran State to bring those responsible to justice.73
70. See Harvey, supra note 16, at 72 (discussing that rate of prosecution has risen
and that, among 384 cases during period of July 2003 to May 2004, Special Unit has
sent seventy-five cases (involving 116 victims) to Office of Public Prosecutor); see also
Bermtldez, supra note 13 (noting that law enforcement authorities have been impli-
cated in extrajudicial executions of youth; noting that charges have been brought
against 285 people).
71. See News Release, Amnesty Int'l (UK), Honduras: Killing of Children Continues
with Impunity (Sept. 6, 2004) (reporting that Special Unit has only been able to examine
400 of over 2300 cases of extrajudicial executions of children and youths, from January
1998 to September 2004, with eighty-eight cases submitted to Attorney General's Office,
and three resulting in convictions; noting that although Honduran State has admitted
degree of police involvement, only two officers have been convicted); see also Peter
Beaumont & Sandra Jordan, Marked for Death, The Tattoo Gang Kids: Rebel Youths Pay a
Terrible Price Under Zero Tolerance, Honduras-Style, OBSERVER (U.K.), Sept. 5, 2004, at 23
(stating that Special Unit has only looked at 400 of over 2300 killings of children during
period of January 1998 to September 2004; reporting that only eighty-eight cases were
forwarded to Attorney General's Office).
72. Although exact statistics are not available, many authoritative sources have
noted that extrajudicial executions of street children continue. See, e.g., 41 % of Deaths,
supra note 11 (discussing Casa Alianza estimates that, during first three quarters of
2005, 124 children and 204 youths between ages of eighteen and twenty-three were
found); Harvey, supra note 16, at 73 (explaining that, from February 2003 to September
2004, nearly 700 additional children were murdered in Honduras); Violence and its Im-
pact, supra note 11, at 2 (reporting that during period of 1998 to 2004, Casa Alianza
registered 2520 violent deaths of minors under age of twenty-three in Honduras); Dal-
ton, supra note 11 (referring to Casa Alianza statistics as providing that during period of
January 1998 to roughly December 2003, Casa Alianza documented 2089 murders of
children and young people under age twenty-three); End to Murders, supra note 11 (re-
ferring to Casa Alianza statistics, which state that, between 1998 and 2003, roughly 2089
minors were assassinated in Honduras); Murders and Torture, supra note 11 (citing Casa
Alianza statistics which state that fifteen street children were assassinated in Honduras
during approximate period from 1996 to 1998, with another sixty victimized by violence
and torture).
73. See Ndiaye Report, supra note 40, 199-200 (documenting recent cases of
forced disappearances in Honduras); see also Violence and its Impact, supra note 11, at 2
(arguing that Honduran State must sanction perpetrators of extrajudicial executions
and international community must focus attention on impunity and continued execu-
tions).
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C. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") and the
U.N. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of
Extra-legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Executions
The Commission, established by the U.N. Economic and So-
cial Council ("ECOSOC"), is responsible for monitoring and re-
sponding to diverse human rights violations."4 In particular, the
Commission addresses the issues of forced disappearances and
summary executions.7" The Commission, composed of fifty-
three Member States including Honduras, meets annually dur-
ing a six-week session in Geneva, Switzerland to examine human
rights violations on a global scale.7 6
The Commission has the authority to examine, monitor,
and publicly report on human rights violations through either
country-specific or issue-specific mandates. 77 In 1982, the Com-
mission appointed the first Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial
74. See U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS 223
(2000) (identifying Commission as major U.N. body handling human rights issues,
which was created by ECOSOC); see also Peter H. F. Bekker, Difference Relating to Immu-
nity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 93 Am. J.
INT'L L. 913, 923 n.2 (1999) (mentioning that ECOSOC created Commission as one of
its organs in 1946).
75. See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Commission on
Human Rights [hereinafter Basic Facts on Human Rights Comm'n], http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrintro.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2005) (noting that main
themes addressed by Commission include disappearances and summary executions); see
also David Weissbrodt, Current Development: The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the
UN Commission on Human Rights, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 685, 687 (1986) (explaining that
Commission initiated creation of position of Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Ex-
ecutions in March 1982).
76. See Michael J. Dennis, Current Development: The Fifty-Seventh Session of the UN
Commission on Human Rights, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 181 (2002) (explaining that annual ses-
sion of Commission took place in Geneva, with fifty-three Member States); see also Rob-
ert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 261, 398 n.156 (2004) (not-
ing that Commission, composed of fifty-three States, meets in Geneva once per year for
six weeks); U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Membership of the
Commission on Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/
62chr/2006members.doc (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (listing Honduras as one of cur-
rent Commission Members).
77. See A.M. Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 50-51 (1999) (noting that
Commission may investigate human rights in particular State or situation of particular
theme or issue in many countries and noting there is reason to doubt effectiveness of
Commission procedures, such as those of Working Group on Enforced Disappear-
ances); see also Basic Facts on Human Rights Comm'n, supra note 75 (explaining that
Commission may address human rights situations on country-specific or issue-specific
basis).
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Executions to address the issue of arbitrary, extrajudicial, and
summary executions.78 The Special Rapporteur's mandate is to
examine situations of arbitrary, extrajudicial, and summary ex-
ecutions, respond effectively to imminent threats of executions,
with special attention to executions of women and children, and
submit findings to the Commission on an annual basis.v9 The
Special Rapporteur must also transmit urgent appeals in cases of
imminent executions, submit annual reports on his or her man-
date, and undertake fact-finding visits to investigate extrajudicial
executions. 80
Motivated by the international community's general sense
78. See U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n
on Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, Introduction
[hereinafter Basic Facts on Special Rapporteur], http://www.unhchr.ch/executions/
(last visited Dec. 28, 2005) (stating that Commission passed Resolution recommending
that ECOSOC create position of Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions in
March 1982 in order to investigate summary and arbitrary executions, along with rec-
ommendations); see also Weissbrodt, supra note 75, at 687 (mentioning that Commis-
sion initiated creation of position of Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions in
March 1982).
79. See Weissbrodt, supra note 75, at 688-89 (discussing progressive grant of author-
ity to Special Rapporteur); see also Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the Interna-
tional Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 33, 89 (2002) (noting that thematic procedures of Special Rapporteur run risk of
inconsistency because no fact-finding guidelines exist; stating that Special Rapporteurs
have not always been provided with unlimited access to regions or human rights situa-
tion and that ability of Special Rapporteurs to ensure effective measures has been lim-
ited); William G. O'Neill, Human Rights Monitoring vs. Political Expediency: The Experience
of the OAS / UN. Mission in Haiti, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 127 (1995) (arguing that
Commission should coordinate and collaborate with other institutions addressing extra-
judicial executions, including Special Rapporteur, U.N. Human Rights Centre in Ge-
neva, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch in Vienna and Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights); HRW, Algeria; HRW Calls on U.N. to Investigate Atrocities
in Algeria, AFRicA NEWS, Mar. 23, 1998 (quoting HRW as urging Commission to
strengthen roles of Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups); Basic Facts on Special
Rapporteur, supra note 78 (noting that Commission requested that Special Rapporteur
continue to examine executions worldwide; submit findings thereon; respond effec-
tively to potential executions; enhance dialog with governments; follow up on country
visits; pay special attention to executions of children, women and human rights defend-
ers; monitor worldwide standards on capital punishment; and apply gendered perspec-
tive to this work).
80. See Alston Report, supra note 17, 9 11 (discussing Special Rapporteur's princi-
pal methods of work as transmitting urgent appeals; responding to individual com-
plaints; issuing press statements; undertaking country visits; and undertaking promo-
tional activities to advance objectives of Commission and General Assembly); see also
Basic Facts on Special Rapporteur, supra note 78 (stating that Special Rapporteur's
mandate includes transmitting urgent appeals, undertaking fact-finding country visits,
and submitting annual reports on activities).
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of alarm at the high rate of impunity in cases of forced disap-
pearances and arbitrary executions, ECOSOC adopted the non-
binding U.N. Principles in 1989.1 The U.N. Principles set forth
comprehensive means for the prompt, serious, and thorough in-
vestigation of all suspected cases of arbitrary, extra-legal, and
summary executions.8 2 Moreover, the U.N. Principles urge
Member States to allocate the necessary authority, budgetary,
and technical resources to those authorized to investigate."
With specific reference to the treatment of victims, the U.N.
Principles recommend adequate autopsies conducted by impar-
tial experts in forensic pathology in order to establish the iden-
tity of victims, as well as the cause, manner, place, and time of
their deaths.8 4
Most importantly, the U.N. Principles urge States to bring
perpetrators to justice or extradite them to the jurisdictions in
which they would more effectively stand trial.8 5 Moreover, the
81. See U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 11 9-17 (providing detailed guidance on
investigating extrajudicial executions); see also Nathanael Heasley et al., Impunity in Gua-
temala: The State's Failure to Provide Justice in the Massacre Cases, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
1115, 1128 (2001) [hereinafter Impunity in Guatemala] (explaining that although U.N.
Principles are not binding, they provide persuasive authority, which guides States); Ir-
win, supra note 30, at 1839 (describing international alarm at violations of right to life
as motivation for creating Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions).
82. See U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 9 (stating that there should be impartial,
thorough, and prompt investigation of all suspected cases of extrajudicial executions,
and noting States' duties to provide investigative offices and resources to conduct au-
topsy); see also Irwin, supra note 30, at 1840 (noting U.N. Principles' emphasis on thor-
ough and impartial investigations of violation of right to life).
83. See U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 1 10 (providing that investigative personnel
must be granted requisite authority and resources to obtain information relevant to
inquiry, including compelling witnesses to share information); see also U.N. Office at
Vienna Ctr. for Social Dev. and Humanitarian Affairs, UNITED NATIONS MANUAL ON THE
EFFECTIVE PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION OF EXTRA-LEGAL, ARBITRARY AND SUMMARY Ex-
ECUTIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHA/12, U.N. Sales No. 91.IV.1 (1991) [hereinafter U.N.
MANUAL], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/executioninvestigation
-91.html#lI (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) (urging States to devote full resources and power
to criminal investigators).
84. See U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 1 12-13 (providing that, where possible,
autopsy shall be conducted by expert in forensic pathology; stating that purpose of
autopsy shall be to determine identity of victim as well as cause, manner, time, and
place of death); see also U.N. MANUAL, supra note 83, §§ III.C, III.D (creating extremely
detailed guidelines on forensic process including scene investigation and autopsy);
Watkin, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that U.N. Principles provide for conducting ade-
quate autopsy).
85. See U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 1 18 (stating that, through investigation,
governments shall ensure that individuals that participated in extrajudicial executions
are brought to justice, regardless of citizenship of perpetrators or place in which of-
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U.N. Principles provide that investigators, victims' families, and
witnesses shall be protected from violence, as well as provided
with relevant information regarding the investigation and prose-
cution." In terms of damages and redress, the U.N. Principles
provide that families and dependants of victims shall be entitled
to compensation within a reasonable amount of time.87
The U.N. Principles reflect the rationale of the Velasquez-
Rodriguez decision, which identified a State duty to investigate
and prosecute human rights violations."8 Although not enforce-
able as binding international law, the U.N. Principles represent
persuasive authority on which Member States rely in conducting
investigations of extrajudicial executions.89 Moreover, the Spe-
fense was committed); see also George William Mugwanya, Expunging the Ghost of Impu-
nity for Severe and Gross Violations of Human Rights and the Commission of Delictijus Gentium:
A Case for the Domestication of International Criminal Law and the Establishment of a Strong
Permanent International Criminal Court, 8 MICH. J. INT'L L. 701, 752 (1999) (describing
U.N. Principles' provision that States shall bring perpetrators of extrajudicial execu-
tions to justice).
86. SeeU.N. Principles, supra note 14, 15-16 (noting that individuals conducting
investigation, as well as those providing information to them, shall be protected from
violence and intimidation; noting that families of victims shall have access to all relevant
information regarding evidence regarding autopsy); see also U.N. MANUAL, supra note 83
(explaining that States shall protect victims and families from intimidation, threats and
violence); Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims' Rights to Truth and
Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1399, 1432 (2002) (observing
that victims and legal representatives of victims have right to information regarding
evidence and hearings).
87. See U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 20 (providing that families and depen-
dents of victims are entitled to fair compensation within reasonable amount of time);
see alsoJames C.N. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in Constitutional
Orders: The Case of Ethiopia, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 235, 279 (1994) (describing
sections of U.N. Principles which provide for reasonable compensation to families and
dependents of victims).
88. See In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1988] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 172
(holding that human rights violations, though not directly committed by Government,
can trigger State liability where State exhibits lack of diligence in preventing and inves-
tigating violation); see also Alston Report, supra note 17, 72 (establishing that isolated
murders of individuals do not give rise to State liability until pattern of violence is
demonstrated, which triggers State responsibility).
89. See Impunity in Guatemala, supra note 81, at 1128 (mentioning that, although
not directly binding on States, U.N. Principles constitute part of customary interna-
tional law and provide persuasive authority that supplements binding treaties); see also
HRW, The New Racism: The Political Manipulation of Ethnicity in C6te d'Ivoire, (2001), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ivorycoast/cotdivO8Ol-O3.htm (last visited
Mar. 11, 2006) (concluding that U.N. Principles establish important principles on effec-
tive investigation and prevention of extrajudicial executions; stating that, although U.N.
Principles are not legally binding, they offer authoritative guidance for States on how to
address extrajudicial executions).
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cial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions relies on the legal
framework set forth in the U.N. Principles in realizing the man-
date." As such, the recommendations of the Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial Executions are included in the body of
customary international law that guides States worldwide.91
In 2002, former Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Execu-
tions AsmaJahangir authored a report detailing the severity and
urgency of extrajudicial executions of children after a fact-find-
ing mission to Honduras.92 Finding it overwhelmingly clear that
security forces have extrajudicially executed children in Hondu-
ras, Jahangir remarked that in most cases, the victims were un-
armed, and that little investigation had been conducted in order
to identify the perpetrators. 93 Special Rapporteur Jahangir fur-
ther noted that the Honduran State is obligated to investigate
these deaths, suggesting that it establish an independent com-
mission to investigate such cases.94 The report provides the
Commission with meaningful and clear policy recommenda-
90. See Alston Report, supra note 17, 10 (mentioning that legal framework of
Special Rapporteur's work includes U.N. Principles); see also Basic Facts on Special Rap-
porteur, supra note 78 (providing that Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions
is requested to investigate violations of right to life as defined in Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and ICCPR and noting that Special Rapporteur's legal work is com-
plemented by U.N. Principles).
91. Accord Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2585 (1991) (arguing that duty to
punish human rights violations is emerging as norm in international law). See generally
Impunity in Guatemala, supra note 81, at 1129 (explaining that findings of Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial Executions represent customary international law).
92. See generally jahangir Report, supra note 5, 7 10-40, 73-88 (describing situation
of extrajudicial executions of children in Honduras and making recommendations on
how to improve situation). Accord T. Christian Miller, Dying Young in Honduras, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at I (reporting on former Special Rapporteur Asma Jahangir's
visit to Honduras and mentioning findings of report which noted instances of children
being murdered by law enforcement authorities).
93. SeeJahangir Report, supra note 5, 7 73-74 (noting that murdered children
were usually unarmed and did not provoke police; stating that little investigation has
been conducted to determine perpetrators); see also Miller, supra note 92, at 1 (men-
tioning Jahangir's visit to Honduras and report which concluded that, in many in-
stances, children had been murdered by police or other groups).
94. SeeJahangir Report, supra note 5, 79 (urging Honduran State to thoroughly
investigate all murders of children; suggesting that Honduran State institute commis-
sion to study situation with goal of forming policy recommendations to eradicate
murders); see also In re Velasquez-Rodriguez, [1988] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
176 (finding that Honduras has duty to investigate every situation involving violation of
rights protected by American Convention and that Honduras fails to fulfill this duty if
violation goes unpunished).
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tions, in addition to the U.N. Principles, which outline an effec-
tive means of investigation.9 The Commission, however, has
been unable to ensure that the Honduran State effectively im-
plements these recommendations, rendering them theoretically
ideal, yet realistically unworkable.96
As such, the Commission and its subsidiary bodies have re-
ceived an overwhelming amount of criticism based on their per-
ceived inability to adequately resolve urgent human rights situa-
tions, as well as their practice of allowing notorious human
rights violators to take active roles in monitoring rights world-
wide.9 7 Critics have argued that States such as China, Congo,
Cuba, Guatemala, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan join the Com-
mission in order to thwart condemnation of their own human
rights policies or to criticize other States' policies." As a result
95. SeeJahangir Report, supra note 5, 73-88 (providing clear policy recommen-
dations for Honduran State to implement in its approach to extrajudicial executions of
children); see also U.N. Principles, supra note 14, 1 9, 12-13 (providing for thorough,
prompt, and impartial investigations of all extrajudicial executions, through physical
collection of evidence and autopsy, to ascertain time of death and perpetrator)
96. See, e.g., Violence and its Impact, supra note 11, at 4-5 (advocating that Commis-
sion and international community should fully implement recommendations of former
Special Rapporteur Jahangir and continually monitor effective application of justice in
Honduras, particularly in cases of extrajudicial executions of children and minors); see
also O'Neill, supra note 79, at 127 (arguing that Commission should coordinate and
collaborate with other institutions addressing extrajudicial executions, including
IACHR, Special Rapporteur, and U.N. Human Rights Centre in Geneva, Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Branch in Vienna).
97. See Editorial, Thugocracies and the U.N., CHI. TRiR.,Jan. 31, 2006, at 12 [hereinaf-
ter Thugocracies] (noting that Commission, which includes Members such as Libya and
Cuba, has come to be known as ineffective, unwilling to condemn Mugabe regime in
Zimbabwe, and merely expressing concern as thousands of civilians were killed in Dar-
fur); see also Warren Hoge, U.N. Chief Bemoans 'Really Difficult' Year and Looks Toward '06,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at 13 [hereinafter U.N. Chief Bemoans] (stating that Commis-
sion has been discredited due to poor rights records of Members); Stevenson Swanson,
Bolton Throws a Wrench; Envoy's 750 Proposals to Reshape Reforms May Thwart UN Plans,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 2005, at 3 [hereinafter Bolton Throws a Wrench] (referring to Com-
mission as discredited for including States such as Libya and Cuba); Editorial, Cuba Joins
in UN Mockery, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at 25 (explaining hypocrisy in Commis-
sion's inclusion of Libya and failure to censure Russia on its actions in Chechnya while
strongly condemning Israel for its policies towards Palestine).
98. See Editorial, Human Rights and the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at 24 [herein-
after Human Rights and the U.N.] (concluding that States such as China, Cuba, and Su-
dan seek membership to stymie criticism of their own practices); see also Howard
LaFranchi, How the US Wants the United Nations to Reform, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
13, 2005, at 2 (quoting spokesman for Ambassador Bolton as saying that Commission is
completely broken; quoting Secretary-General Annan as saying that States seek mem-
bership to protect themselves and criticize others); Editorial, Diplomatic Abuse, CHI.
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of this widespread criticism, human rights activists, newspapers,
rights organizations, and U.N. leaders have advocated reforming
or replacing the Commission. 99
II. COMPETING PROPOSALS ON COMMISSION REFORM
In light of international critique of the Commission, com-
peting proposals have outlined possible Commission reforms.1"'
Two proposals originate from within the U.N. itself-one
promulgated by the High Level Panel, and one advocated by
Secretary-General Annan. t0 ' In addition, the human rights or-
ganization HRW, along with representatives from numerous in-
ternational NGOs, put forward its own recommendations on
Commission reform. 10 2 The following Sections will discuss these
TRIB., May 7, 2005, at 20 (contending that Commission has sabotaged itself by providing
safe harbor for some of world's most notorious human rights violators).
99. See Newt Gingrich & George Mitchell, Report card from America; UN reform, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 26, 2005, at 4 (claiming that international community must take
prompt action to abolish and replace discredited Commission with Council); see also
Editorial, Human Rights and the U.N., supra note 98 (positing that States should vote to
abandon existing Commission during 2005 World Summit).
100. See High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, 11 282-91, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter
High Level Panel Report], available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf
(providing High Level Panel's recommendations on Commission reform); see also In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 & Annex (2005) [hereinafter Report of Secretary-
General], available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm (detailing Sec-
retary-General Annan's vision for Commission restructuring and creation of Council);
HRW, Joint Letter on the U.N. Human Rights Council, Letter from Fifty-Three Civil Society Lead-
ers to the President of the U.N. General Assembly (Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter HRW Proposal],
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/1/0O1/globalI1955_txt.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2006) (putting forth substantive Commission reforms recommended by
international human rights NGO community); Report of the Secretary-General, In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Addendum 1, Apr.
14, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 [hereinafter Addendum to Report of Secretary-Gen-
eral], available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/addl (last visited Mar. 11, 2006)
(providing further substantive recommendations on creating Council); HRW, 160
NGOs Identify Essential Elements of a U.N. Human Rights CouncilJan. 16, 2005 [hereinafter
Second HRW Proposal], http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/10/global12401.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2006) (following up with additional NGO supporters and provid-
ing feedback to Council Working Group on draft proposal).
101. SeeHigh Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 282-91 (providing High Level
Panel's recommendations on improving Commission); see also Report of Secretary-Gen-
eral, supra note 100, 181-83 (detailing Secretary-General Annan's recommendation
that Commission be abolished in favor of Council).
102. See HRWProposal, supra note 100 (explaining HRW and NGO community's
vision of Commission reform); see also Second HRW Proposal, supra note 100 (following
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competing proposals for Commission reform, as well as the U.N.
Draft Text on the creation of a Human Rights Council.
A. Proposal by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change ("High Level Panel")
The first proposal regarding the reform of the Commission
was put forth by the High Level Panel, a group of experts called
together by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in September 2003 in
order to better understand threats to international peace and
make recommendations addressing the security needs of the in-
ternational community. 10 Framed within the context of inter-
national security, the High Level Panel made specific recom-
mendations for reforming the Commission."0 4 In making its rec-
ommendations, the High Level Panel recognized that wavering
credibility and professionalism, as well as Member States' joining
the Commission to avoid criticism of their own human rights
policies, have undermined the Commission's capacity in recent
years. 0 5 The High Level Panel argued that reforming the Com-
mission represents the best means through which the U.N.
human rights system can achieve a more efficient operation and
more aptly fulfill its mandate. 10 6
up with additional organizations' recommendations and providing feedback to Council
Working Group on draft proposal).
103. See High Level Panel Report, Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 100,
2-3 (stating Secretary-General Annan's request to Members of High Level Panel); see
also Binding the Colossus-America and the World, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2003 (noting crea-
tion of High Level Panel in order to address current dangers and coordinate U.N.'s
response).
104. See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 2-3 (mentioning Secretary-
General Annan's request for Members of High Level Panel to investigate international
security); see also Can Its Credibility Be Repaired ?-The United Nations, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10,
2005 (explaining High Level Panel's conclusions that radical reform is needed at U.N.).
105. See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 283 (concluding that Commis-
sion's ability to perform activities has been eroded by lagging credibility and standards
in professionalism; expressing concern over States' seeking Commission membership to
protect themselves against criticism or criticize other States; noting that Commission
cannot be credible if it maintains double standards); see also Frances Williams, UN Rights
Official Backs Call By Annan for Reform, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 22, 2005, at 8 (re-
marking that High Commissioner Louise Arbour agreed that High Level Panel's con-
clusions on lagging legitimacy of Commission were entirely justified).
106. See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 284 (arguing that Commission
reform is necessary to make U.N. human rights system perform efficiently and better
realize its mandate); see also Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 182 (con-
tending that current U.N. human fights framework is currently under considerable
strain, with change essential to meaningful progress in human rights).
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Noting that the Commission was initially comprised of dele-
gation members with professional qualifications and experience
in human rights work, the High Level Panel advocated that
Commission Member States restore this practice by nominating
prominent human rights figures as the heads of their delega-
tions.10 7 Most notably, the High Level Panel proposed that
membership of the Commission should be made universal-
available to all U.N. Member States-arguing that Commission
membership remains a difficult and sensitive subject that pro-
vokes international tension and encourages the politicization of
human rights.1 "8 Also, the High Level Panel recommended the
creation of an advisory council or panel, composed of fifteen ex-
perts to advise on country-specific issues and thematic man-
dates.1 0 9
The High Level Panel also recommended that the High
Commissioner for Human Rights ("High Commissioner") be re-
quired to prepare an annual report on the global situation of
human rights, which would serve as a framework for discussion
with the Commission. 1 Additionally, the High Level Panel pro-
posed that the Security Council request that the High Commis-
107. See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 1 286 (stating that, although
Commission was initially composed of delegations which evinced high professional
qualifications and experience in human rights, this is no longer practiced; arguing that
high standards should be restored, with nomination of Commission delegation Mem-
bers with exceptional human rights qualifications); see also Global Pol'y Forum, Reform
of the Human Rights Commission, [hereinafter Global Pol'y Forum], http://www.
globalpolicy.org/reform/topics/hrcindex.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (noting High
Level Panel's proposal that Member States appoint prominent, experienced human
rights experts).
108. See generally High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 285 (finding that
Commission membership should be made universal in order to defuse tension between
Members seeking seats; to depoliticize Commission membership; and to refocus Com-
mission on human rights, not politics). But see Vance Serchuk, The Good Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at 31 (arguing that bigger Commission membership would
render deliberations more difficult).
109. See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 1 287 (positing that Council
should be supported by advisory council consisting of roughly fifteen independent ex-
perts, representing world's regions); see also Global Pol'y Forum, supra note 107 (refer-
ring to High Level Panel's proposal to establish advisory council).
110. SeeHigh Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 288 (recommending that High
Commissioner for Human Rights ("High Commissioner") prepare annual report on
state of human rights worldwide); see also Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100
(contending that Security Council's increasing requests for briefings by High Commis-
sioner emphasizes need for Security Council Resolutions to include human rights con-
siderations).
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sioner make regular reports on the implementation of human
rights-related Security Council Resolutions.1"' Lastly, the High
Level Panel concluded that, at some point, the Commission
should become a Human Rights Council that does not report to
ECOSOC but, rather, stands alone as a charter-based body akin
to the Security Council.112
B. Proposal by Secretary General Kofi Annan ("Report of
Secretary-General")
In response to the High Level Panel's recommendations,
and in preparation for the 2005 U.N. World Summit, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan released a report in March 2005 and an ad-
dendum amplifying the recommendations in that report in April
2005, advocating the replacement of the Commission with a new
Human Rights Council."' Underscoring the critical nature of
human rights in an age of terrorism,"14 Secretary-General Annan
111. See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 289 (proposing that Security
Council and Peacebuilding Commission should arrange for regular briefings on human
rights issues by High Commissioner on implementation of human rights issues in Secur-
ity Council resolutions); see also Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 144 (ex-
plaining that Security Council's frequent requests for briefing by High Commissioner
illustrate need for human rights input resolutions on peace and security); Warren
Hoge, Human Rights Commissioner Urges U.N. to Act Quickly on Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2005, at 9 (discussing High Commissioner Louise Arbour's briefing Security Council on
human rights violations in Sudan and her urging Security Council to refer case to Inter-
national Criminal Court).
112. See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, 291 (proposing that, in terms
of long term Commission reform, Member States should consider elevating Commis-
sion to Human Rights Council ("Council"), no longer subsidiary to ECOSOC, but equal
to Charter-based bodies such as Security Council); see also HRWProposa, supra note 100
(arguing that Council should be elevated to organ status within five years and, in
meantime, should act as subsidiary of General Assembly); U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, 61st Session, Informal Consultations on the Establishment of Human Rights
Council and the Transitional Arrangement, Civil Society Proposal for the Human
Rights Council (2005) [hereinafter Informal Consultations], http://www.unwatch.org/
site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=BDKKISNqEmG&b=1313923&ct=1747953 (last visited
Mar. 11, 2006) (recommending, on behalf of NGO community, that Council be ele-
vated to principal organ status within five years and, transitionally, should serve as sub-
sidiary body of General Assembly).
113. See generally Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100 (contending that
Commission should be replaced by stronger Council); Colum Lynch, U.N. Leader's Plan
Draws Objections; U.S. Dissents on Rules for Use of Force, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at A13
(describing Secretary-General Annan's proposal as his most ambitious effort to close
gap between wealthy and developing Nations).
114. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 1 140 (arguing that we
weaken efforts to fight terrorism when we infringe on human rights); see also Louis
Henkin, The First Ten Years of the Office, and the Next, 35 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv.
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argued that the current U.N. system falls short of achieving its
long-term, high-level commitment to human rights protec-
tion.1 15 Secretary-General Annan emphasized the serious need
for further resources and personnel to train "country teams" in
order to increase the effectiveness of Commission programs," 6
as well as the need for the Commission to play a greater role in
monitoring the implementation of Security Council Resolu-
tions.' 17 Secretary-General Annan further argued that the Com-
mission remains markedly ill-equipped to effectively respond to
human rights challenges facing the international community."'
Recommending harmonized guidelines to replace the dis-
jointedness of the current system, Secretary-General Annan ar-
gued that the duplication of reporting requirements across vari-
ous bodies, combined with poor implementation of human
rights recommendations, creates a confusing situation.1 19 Refer-
465, 467 (2004) (explaining that Office of High Commissioner has broadened its un-
derstanding of human rights in age of terrorism).
115. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 141 (contending that cur-
rent U.N. human rights framework is currently under considerable strain, with change
essential to meaningful progress in human rights); see also U.N. Chief Bemoans, supra
note 97, at 13 (noting that Commission has been discredited due to poor rights records
of Members); Editorial, Reforming the U.N., WASH. PosT,June 30, 2005, at A22 [hereinaf-
ter Reforming the U.N.] (arguing that Secretary-General Annan's proposals to make Com-
mission smaller and composed of democracies with high human rights records re-
present positive changes that will strengthen institution and make it less susceptible to
critique).
116. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 142 (arguing that further
resources and staff, along with stronger Commission capacity to train country teams,
are needed to implement U.N. programs); see also Samuel R. Berger & Brent Scowcroft,
The Right Tools to Build Nations, WASH. PosT, July 27, 2005, at A21 (concluding that U.N.
reform must include greater attention and resources from key contributors such as
United States and allies).
117. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 144 (noting that increasing
invitations from Security Council to High Commissioner underscore greater awareness
of need to consider human rights in drafting Security Council Resolutions on peace
and security and arguing that human rights must be mainstreamed into U.N. system);
see also Hoge, supra note 111 (describing High Commissioner Louise Arbour's briefing
Security Council on human rights situation in Darfur as example of interdependence of
Security Council Resolutions and human rights).
118. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 145 (referring to Office of
High Commissioner as woefully ill-equipped to respond to international community's
human rights challenges); see also Colum Lynch, Bolton Plans to Restart Stalled Efforts to
Restructure U.N.; Ambassador Seeks to Ensure Permanent Security Council Members Have Seats
on New Rights Council, WASH. PosT, Jan. 2, 2006, at A07 [hereinafter Bolton Plans] (quot-
ing Ambassador Bolton as saying that there is near universal belief that Commission's
intergovernmental decision-making process is broken beyond repair).
119. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 147 (observing that U.N.
842 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:812
encing the Commission's declining image with respect to credi-
bility and professionalism, Secretary-General Annan proposed
that Member States resolve to replace the Commission with a
smaller, permanently standing Human Rights Council. 12' He re-
frained from further sketching the Council's substantive fea-
tures, but recommended that its Members be elected directly by
the General Assembly-and by a vote of no less than a two-thirds
majority of U.N. Member States-and that the Council act as a
chamber of peer review.121 Moreover, Secretary-General Annan
proposed that all Council Members be required, in their own
domestic policies, to abide by the highest domestic human rights
standards. 122
treaty-body system remains poorly known, weakened by poor implementation, and du-
plicated reporting requirements; arguing that harmonized treaty-body guidelines are
need to make bodies function in uniform fashion); see also Jonathan Fanton, Taking
Human Rights Seriously, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2006 (finding that political considerations
between Member States overly influence Commission activities); Creation of Peacebuilding
Commission, Emergency Response Fund Highlights, as 60th General Assembly Takes First Steps
Towards Major U.N. Reform, US FED NEWS, Dec. 27, 2005, at 17 (referring to Commission
as marred by finger-pointing and double standards); Current Events at the United Nations
Transcript, CNN INr'L, Dec. 2, 2005 (noting that membership remains most critical ele-
ment of Council reforms and arguing that international community must support Sec-
retary-General Annan's proposals).
120. See Addendum to Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 6 (contend-
ing that Council must replace Commission if U.N. is going to take human rights as
serious as security and development; arguing that civil, cultural, economic, political,
and social rights, including right to development, should be addressed equally); see also
Editorial, Impasse on Human Rights, WASH. PosT, Jan. 20, 2006, at A16 (noting that Secre-
tary-General Annan proposed replacing Commission with smaller, more effective Coun-
cil).
121. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 183 (noting that Member
States must decide whether Council will act as principal U.N. organ or subsidiary of
General Assembly; arguing that, in either case, Members must be selected directly by
General Assembly through two-thirds majority vote); see also Addendum to Report of
SecretaryGeneral, supra note 100, 6 (stating that Council should act as chamber of
peer review); Reforming the U.N., supra note 115 (claiming that Secretary-General An-
nan's proposals to make Commission smaller and composed of democracies with high
human rights records represent positive changes that will strengthen institution and
make it less susceptible to critique). But seeJoshua Muravchik, Corruption, Hypocrisy Will
Always Prevai4 L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at MI (opining that making Commission
smaller will have little impact on ending Commission's disgrace).
122. See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 100, 183 (stating that Member
States should determine whether Council will serve as principal U.N. organ or subsidi-
ary General Assembly body; contending that, in any case, Members should be selected
directly by General Assembly through two-thirds majority vote); see also Reforming the
U.N., supra note 115 (contending that Secretary-General Annan's proposals to make
Commission smaller and composed of democracies with high human rights records
represent positive changes that will strengthen institution and make it less susceptible
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The U.N. General Assembly debated Secretary-General An-
nan's proposals during the U.N. World Summit in September
2005, endorsing the general idea in the World Summit Outcome
Document ("Outcome Document") after negotiations on the
Council's substantive features. 123 Most basically, the General As-
sembly resolved to create a Council to further strengthen the
existing U.N. human rights system. 124 Although the General As-
sembly did not assign specific obligations and duties to the
Council, it provided that the Council will be responsible for the
promotion of universal respect and protection of human rights
in a fair manner.125 In addition, the Council will have the re-
sponsibility of addressing gross and systematic violations, making
recommendations on remedying such situations, and coordinat-
ing with other U.N. agencies.' 26 Lastly, the General Assembly
requested that its President of the Assembly conduct transparent
and inclusive negotiations, to be completed within the U.N.'s
60th Session, in order to establish the Council's defining fea-
tures, including its functions, mandate, membership, size, and
to critique). But see Muravchik, supra note 121, at MI (claiming that making Commis-
sion smaller will have little impact on improving Commission's reputation).
123. See Colum Lynch & Glenn Kessler, U.N. Scales Back Plan of Action, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2005, at A06 (remarking that Secretary-General Annan was pleased with U.N.'s
commitment to reduce child mortality, disease, and poverty as well as decision to create
Council and Peacebuilding Commission); see also Mark Turner, United Nations Takes An-
other Step Along Rocky Road to Reform, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 2005, at 10 (noting
difficulties in establishing Council; mentioning particular points of contention as man-
date, membership, and size; stating that 2005 World Summit Outcome was only possi-
ble because substantive details were removed at last minute).
124. See G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 157, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter World Summit Resolution] (referring to Member States' commitment to strengthen
U.N. human rights machinery and resolving to create Council); see also Comment, The
United Nations Is Flawed Yet Vital, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 16, 2005, at 13 (reporting
that structure of Council will be left to future negotiation).
125. See World Summit Resolution, supra note 124, 1 158 (providing that Council
will be responsible for promoting human rights for all); see also Better Than Nothing
United Nations Reform, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2005 (claiming that World Summit Resolu-
tion was not completely devoid of substance, particularly with respect to replacement of
Commission with Council). But see Maggie Farley & Warren Vieth, Bush, Annan Tout the
Role of the U.N.; The President Surprises Summit Delegates by Reversing U.S. Positions that Nearly
Sank Talks, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A13 (explaining President Bush's criticism of
World Summit for failing to establish defining features of Council).
126. See World Summit Resolution, supra note 124, 1 159 (providing that Council
will have responsibility to address and remedy situations of gross human rights viola-
tions); see also Fix It or Scrap It; UN Reform, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2006 [hereinafter Fix It]
(reporting that Council would be ready to act in response to serious violations of
human rights).
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working procedures.
27
In 2005, the General Assembly authorized a Working Group
of human rights experts ("Working Group") to negotiate the
Council's defining characteristics and to formulate a proposal
for the General Assembly's consideration. 128 At the end of the
2005 World Summit, the substantive terms at issue mainly in-
cluded Council membership eligibility, size, term-limits, and vot-
ing procedures. 129 The ideas expressed in the Outcome Docu-
ment received support from the United States 3 ' and major in-
ternational newspapers.13 ' They also received qualified support
127. See World Summit Resolution, supra note 124, 160 (stating that General
Assembly will oversee open and transparent negotiations); see also Howard LaFranchi,
UN Leaders Endorse Modest Reforms, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Sept. 15, 2005, at 1 (explain-
ing that specific characteristics of Council will be decided by negotiations and approved
by General Assembly).
128. See Assembly President Says Human Rights Council Negotiations Could Wind Up Next
Month, UN NEWS CENTRE, Nov. 23, 2005 [hereinafter Council Negotiations] (remarking
that U.N. General Assembly President was hopeful that Council negotiations would be
complete by conclusion of December 2005); see also U.N., Dep't of Pub. Info., Daily Press
Briefing by the Offices of the Spokesman for the Secretay-General and the Spokesperson for the
GeneralAssembly President, Oct. 5, 2005 (noting that Council negotiations began on Octo-
ber 11, 2005 and were scheduled to conclude at end of 2005).
129. See Council Negotiations, supra note 128 (stating that points of contention dur-
ing Council negotiations included frequency of Council meetings, number of possible
Members, and voting procedures); see also Warren Hoge, Officials at U.N. Seek Fast Action
on Rights Pane N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at I [hereinafter Fast Action] (mentioning that
Council size, term-limits, and voting procedures were subject to negotiation; quoting
Chief of Staff to Secretary-General Annan as saying that Commission reform has be-
come litmus test of U.N. renewal and underscoring importance of timely negotiations);
Fanton, supra note 119, at 17 (claiming that U.N. Member States and American repre-
sentatives must advocate importance of Council more forcefully and assume greater
presence during negotiations).
130. See Warren Hoge, Panel's Report, Faulting U.N., Urges Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2005, at 1 (reporting that Congressional Task Force headed by Newt Gingrich and
George J. Mitchell endorsed Secretary-General Annan's proposal and recommended
membership be restricted to practicing democracies); see also Editorial, Wrong on
Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at 24 (arguing that Ambassador Bolton's idea
to have permanent Council seats for permanent Security Council Members would guar-
antee seats to countries with questionable records, including China, Russia, and United
States). But seeJoe Lauria, Little Consensus on What Future Holds for United Nations Annan's
Plans Meet Resistance From US, Others, BosToN GLOBE, June 22, 2005, at A6 (describing
difference between U.S. goal of having only democracies permitted to join Council,
while Secretary-General Annan would favor membership for any State voted in by two-
thirds of U.N. General Assembly).
131. See Editorial, Blocking Reform at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at 26 [here-
inafter Blocking Reform] (contending that one significant U.N. reform needed is crea-
tion of Council with permanent membership of countries with highest human rights
records); see also Gingrich & Mitchell, supra note 99 (claiming that Council must re-
place Commission).
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from U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton.
1 32
C. Proposal by Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organization Community ("HRW Proposal")
The HRW Proposal, created by the human rights NGO com-
munity, provides specific recommendations as to the Council's
composition, election procedures, mandate, special procedures,
status, voting procedures, and working methods.1 3 HRW also
proposed that the Council be elevated to a status equal to that of
the other six U.N. principal organs within five years of the Coun-
cil's existence, with transitional status as a subsidiary body of the
General Assembly until that point."' HRW also advocated that
the Council have a mandate that includes any matters relating to
the protection and promotion of human rights in all countries,
with special authorization to address specific situations of contin-
uing, gross, systematic, or urgent rights violations, and the power
to make recommendations to Member States and other U.N. or-
gans, such as the General Assembly or Security Council. t35
132. See Bolton Plans, supra note 118 (noting Ambassador Bolton's goal to have
permanent Council seats for permanent Security Council Members); see also Warren
Hoge, U.N. Creates Commission to Assist Nations Recovering From Wars, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21,
2005, at 25 (stating that Bolton prioritized creation of Council and noting Bolton's
concern over lagging in process).
133. See HRWProposal, supra note 100 (proposing significant changes for abolish-
ing Commission and creating Council); see also Second HRW Proposal, supra note 100
(affirming that, of Working Group's draft resolution proposals, HRW deems following
Council features most important: Council purpose language should be taken from
World Summit Resolution; Members shall abide by highest human rights standards;
Members shall be peer-reviewed; Council shall meet throughout year; and Council shall
provide for meaningful NGO participation).
134. See HRW Proposal supra note 100 (explaining that Council should be elevated
to organ status within five years and, in meantime, should act as subsidiary General
Assembly body); see also Eric Ting-Lun Huang, Taiwan's Status in a Changing World:
United Nations Representation and Membership for Taiwan, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L.
55, 64 (2003) (noting that there are six principal organs of U.N., including ECOSOC,
General Assembly, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, Security Council, and
Trusteeship Council); Informal Consultations, supra note 112 (supporting elevation of
Council to principal organ status within five years and noting that, transitionally, it
should serve as subsidiary body of General Assembly body).
135. See HRW Proposal, supra note 100 (proposing that Council address any matters
relating to protection of human rights in any country, as well as be empowered to make
recommendations to other U.N. bodies, such as Security Council and General Assem-
bly); see also World Summit Resolution, supra note 124, 1 159 (noting that Council
should address all violations of human rights, including those classified as gross and
systematic, and be authorized to make recommendations in response to such situa-
tions).
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In terms of the Council's composition, HRW proposed that,
as a prerequisite to obtaining Council membership, States ac-
tively adopt the highest domestic human rights standards, which
would implicitly exclude notorious rights violators from mem-
bership.136 With respect to procedural requirements for elec-
tions and voting, HRW recommended that Council members be
elected by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly. 3 v
Moreover, the HRW Proposal suggested that the human rights
record of each candidate State be considered in evaluating its
fitness for membership."3 ' HRW also proposed that the Council
be structured as a standing body that meets on a regular basis
throughout the year in order to ensure a timely response to is-
sues of serious human rights concern.139 In addition to HRW,
this proposal received support from over fifty-two other individu-
als and international human rights organizations, including such
influential groups as Amnesty International, Frd~ration Interna-
tionale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, Freedom House,
Human Rights First, the International Commission of Jurists,
and the International Crisis Group.1 4 °
136. See HRW Proposal, supra note 100 (stating that States seeking positions of
power on Council must have records that exhibit highest human rights standards); see
also Human Rights and the U.N., supra note 98 (describing current system as one in which
States with notorious rights records seek Commission membership in order to thwart
criticism of their own policies).
137. See HRWProsposal, supra note 100 (recommending that Council Members be
elected by two-thirds of General Assembly); see also Lauria, supra note 130 (discussing
Secretary-General Annan's proposal, like that of HRW, as favoring vote by two-thirds
majority of General Assembly).
138. See HRW Proposal, supra note 100 (proposing that Member States consider
candidate States' human rights records when electing them for Council membership);
see also Blocking Reform, supra note 131 (positing that Council should be composed of
Members with excellent human rights records).
139. See HRW Proposal, supra note 100 (noting that Council should be standing
body with regular meetings and with option of calling special sessions); see also Blocking
Reform, supra note 131 (underscoring importance of establishing Council as permanent
body).
140. See HRW Proposal, supra note 100 (detailing proposed Commission changes
and Council formation from HRW and international human rights NGO community);
see also Second HRWProposal, supra note 100 (opining that following Council features are
most important: Council purpose language should be taken from World Summit Reso-
lution; Members shall abide by highest human rights standards; Members shall be peer-
reviewed; Council shall meet throughout year; and Council shall provide for meaning-
ful NGO participation).
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D. Draft Text on the Creation of the Human Rights
Council ("Council")
In February 2006, the Working Group responsible for draft-
ing the terms of the Human Rights Council circulated a Draft
Text for the General Assembly to consider. 141 Most notably, the
Draft Text provided that the Council will be a permanent body,
composed of forty-five Member States elected by the General As-
sembly, in accordance with regional representation. 142 While
the Draft Text also provided that all U.N. Member States may be
considered for Council membership, it emphasized that, in se-
lecting members, Member States should consider candidate
States' commitments and contributions to human rights, as well
as the States' own human rights records.1 41
While the Draft Text provided that Council members shall
be guided by the highest human rights standards and urged that
voting States consider whether any measures involving gross
human rights violations are currently pending against candidate
States, but the Draft Text did not explicitly prevent notorious
rights violators from gaining access to Council membership. 1
44
141. See U.N. Watch, U.N. Documents, Human Rights Council Draft Text (Feb. 1,
2005) [hereinafter Council Draft Text], http://www.unwatch.org/site/apps/nl/con-
tent2.asp?c=BDKKISNqEmG&b=1355321&ct=1952663 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (estab-
lishing terms of Council for consideration of General Assembly); see also Warren Hoge,
With its Human Rights Oversight Under Fire, U.N. Submits a Plan for a Strengthened Agency,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at 6 [hereinafter Oversight Under Fire] (discussing defining fea-
tures of Council Draft Text); HRW, Letter in Response to the Options Paper on the U.N.
Human Rights Council, Nov. 14, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/16/
globall2042.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) (listing Working Group experts as Presi-
dent of 60th Session of General Assembly, Jan Eliasson; Permanent Representative and
Co-Chair of Council Negotiations, Ricardo Alberto Arias; and Permanent Representa-
tive and Co-Chair of Council Negotiations, Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo).
142. See Council Draft Text, supra note 141, OP 7, 10 (recommending that Council
meet regularly and be composed of forty-five Member States); see also Oversight Under
Fire, supra note 141 (remarking on Council membership and frequency of Council
meetings). But see Fix It, supra note 126 (explaining that American diplomats would
prefer Council not to have more than thirty Members).
143. See Council Draft Text, supra note 141, OP 8, PP 11 (stating that candidates'
human rights backgrounds should be considering in determining membership; discuss-
ing commitment to strengthening U.N.'s promotion of all human rights equally); see
also Oversight Under Fire, supra note 141 (noting weight Council will give to States'
human rights records).
144. See Council Draft Text, supra note 141, OP 8 (providing that, in being consid-
ered for Council membership, candidates' records with respect to gross violations shall
be considered); see also Plan for UN Rights Council Circulated, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006
(describing consideration given to candidates' human rights records).
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The language of the Draft Text granted the Council a broad
mandate to prevent human rights violations through dialogue
and cooperation, and gave the Council authority to promptly re-
spond to grave human rights situations.145 The Draft Text also
stated that States will be elected by a majority vote. 14 6 Last, the
Draft Text stated that the Council will serve as a subsidiary organ
of the General Assembly and concluded that the current Com-
mission on Human Rights should be abolished by June 2006.147
In March 2006, the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to
adopt Resolution 60/251, almost entirely mirroring the Draft
Text, and to create the Council.
14 8
III. THE IMPACT OF COMMISSION REFORM ON THE
INVESTIGATION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS OF
HONDURAN STREET CHILDREN
The U.N. human rights machinery is currently in a state of
momentous transition.149 The aforementioned proposals sug-
gest innovative solutions for the restructuring of the Human
Rights Commission. 150  The proposals outlined by the High
Level Panel and Secretary-General Kofi Annan provide meaning-
ful guidance on improving the reputation and activities of the
145. See Council Draft Text, supra note 141, OP 5(f) (using broad language to
grant Council power to respond to human rights violations); see also Oversight Under Fire,
supra note 141 (noting Draft Text's broad language).
146. See Council Draft Text, supra note 141, OP 7 (providing that Council Mem-
bers shall be elected by majority of General Assembly); see also Oversight Under Fire, supra
note 143 (discussing Council voting procedures).
147. See Council Draft Text, supra note 141, OP 1, 13 (affirming that Council will
act as subsidiary body of General Assembly and Commission will be abolished by June
2006); see also Oversight Under Fire, supra note 141 (noting Council's position as subsidi-
ary of General Assembly).
148. See G.A. Res. 60/251, 1-16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006); see
also Warren Hoge, U.N. Approves a New Council on Rights Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2006, at 3 (stating that 170 Member States in General Assembly voted in favor of creat-
ing Council; noting that General Assembly voted to have Council Members elected by
absolute majority as opposed to two-thirds majority); Mark Turner, UN Human Rights
Vote Leaves US Isolated, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 16, 2006, at 11 (reporting that 170
Member States voted in favor of replacing Commission with Council, despite opposition
from U.S.).
149. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (noting that, in light of Members'
commitment to strengthening U.N. human rights system, U.N. Member States decide
to create Council).
150. See supra notes 100-140 and accompanying text (describing background on
three models proposing how to reform U.N. human rights machinery).
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Commission.'5 1 Looking at the case of street children in Hondu-
ras, however, it becomes evident that the HRW Proposal creates
the most appropriate, nuanced, and workable framework for
Commission reform. 152 The following Section will critique these
proposals.
A. Critique of the High Level Panel's Proposal
The High Level Panel appropriately addressed the U.N.
human rights machinery within the context of threats to interna-
tional peace and security. 15  To that end, the High Level Panel
made several sensible proposals to reform the Commission. 154
These suggestions, however, do not sufficiently address the situa-
tion of street children in Honduras and the DGIC's implementa-
tion of the U.N. Principles. 5
The High Level Panel rightly recognized that the Commis-
sion's reputation has been seriously undermined in recent
years.' 56 However, its recommendation that the Commission ex-
pand membership to all Member States, if implemented, would
likely perpetuate the system's existing weaknesses.' 57 Universal
151. See supra notes 103-132 and accompanying text (explaining recommendations
made by High Level Panel and Secretary-General Annan as to how to strengthen U.N.
human rights machinery).
152. See supra notes 17-25, 100, 133-140 and accompanying text (describing arbi-
trary murders of Honduran street children and detailing Council proposals advocated
by HRW and NGO community).
153. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text (noting Secretary-General An-
nan's request to High Level Panel and their recommendation that U.N. undergo signif-
icant reform).
154. See supra note 107-112 and accompanying text (recalling that, historically
speaking, Commission Members' delegations were composed of some of world's most
qualified human rights experts; stating that Commission should be supported by advi-
sory council or panel, hypothetically composed of fifteen individuals and representative
of different regions).
155. See supra notes 47-65, 81-87, 107 and accompanying text (documenting
DGIC's weak investigative techniques; describing U.N. Principles' provisions on impar-
tial, prompt, and thorough investigations of extrajudicial executions; explaining that
Commission was originally composed of professionals with highest human rights qualifi-
cations and expertise in human rights).
156. See supra notes 97, 105 and accompanying text (contending that Commis-
sion's credibility has been undermined by States seeking membership to shield them-
selves from criticism, discussing Commission's discredited reputation and referring to
Commission's weak reputation as result of admitting countries such as Libya and
Cuba).
157. See supra note 108 (stating that membership represents most contentious issue
for Commission and that making membership universal would defuse tension between
Member States; arguing that larger Commission would render body more unworkable).
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Commission membership would make States that permit extraju-
dicial executions, like Honduras, responsible for ensuring that
other States prevent and investigate extrajudicial executions. 158
Were this recommendation implemented, Honduras would con-
tinue to hold a position on the Commission and this would con-
tinue to shield the Honduran State from criticism, creating little
incentive to improve the DGIC's implementation of the U.N.
Principles or the Honduran State's investigation into the deaths
of street children.1 59
Similarly, offering Commission membership to all U.N.
Member States would do little to realign the U.N.'s focus on
targeting the weak judicial and law enforcement system in Hon-
duras.1 60 In order to combat complicity, corruption, ineffective-
ness, and impartiality within the DGIC, the U.N. human rights
framework must focus less on superficial institutional reforms
like Commission membership.'61 Instead, the U.N. human
rights system must devote its time to actively investigating and
censuring substantive rights violations committed by agents of
the Honduran State. 1 62 To that end, the High Level Panel could
have recommended that the Commission make a greater com-
mitment to assisting States with significant logistical and budget-
ary limitations in order to better implement the U.N. Princi-
ples. 16 3
Although the High Level Panel recommended the creation
158. See supra note 97-98 and accompanying text (mentioning discredited reputa-
tion of Commission as result of admitting countries with poor human rights records).
159. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (claiming that Commission has
failed to appropriately prevent and condemn massive rights violations such as those in
Darfur because many Commission Member States have dubious rights records).
160. See supra notes 50-51, 54-55, 57, 60, 62-65 and accompanying text (describing
extraordinary problems plaguing Honduran police relating to budget, corruption, and
logistics, and explaining effect of weak investigative techniques on Public Prosecutor's
ability to bring perpetrators to justice).
161. See supra notes 93, 133-140 and accompanying text (finding it clear that Hon-
duran children have been murdered by security forces and arguing that Commission
reform must entail more than mere superficial revisions).
162. See supra notes 8, 12, 65, 81, 89-90 and accompanying text (documenting in-
stances of Honduran police participating in extrajudicial executions of children and
concluding that U.N. Principles are not binding on States but stand as persuasive au-
thority relied upon by Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions and States).
163. See supra notes 54-58, 103-112 and accompanying text (noting failure to rec-
ommend that Commission devote further resources to assist States implement U.N.
Principles and documenting extreme lack of logistical support plaguing Honduran law
enforcement agencies).
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of an advisory council to consult on thematic mandates, such as
extrajudicial executions, it failed to recognize the limitations fac-
ing Commission Special Rapporteurs, such as the Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial Executions.1 64 The High Level Panel
Proposal could have made specific recommendations as to how
to strengthen the role of Special Rapporteurs, for example, by
increasing logistical and personnel resources. 16 5 Such a reform
would allow the Special Rapporteur to follow up the initial inves-
tigation of Honduras with another fact-finding mission to Hon-
duras and report to the international community on the Hondu-
ran State's slow progress in implementing the U.N. Principles on
Extrajudicial Executions. 166 Moreover, strengthening the role of
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions with further
staff and budgetary resources would permit him to work, on a
long-term basis, with challenged States to create a working
model for combating extrajudicial executions and increasing ac-
countability within the judiciary and law enforcement branches
of government. 167
Also, the High Level Panel Proposal did not sufficiently
solve the problems facing Honduran street children, because it
failed to provide concrete steps on how to better address sub-
stantive human rights violations. 161 In this sense, the High Level
Panel Proposal took a very theoretical approach to human rights
reform, and failed to censure actual rights violations, such as the
right to life and the right to be free from torture, that are pro-
tected by international human rights treaties.169 These rights
164. See supra notes 79, 103-112 and accompanying text (refraining from com-
menting on limitations facing Commission Special Rapporteurs but noting challenges
facing Special Rapporteurs).
165. See supra notes 79, 103-112 and accompanying text (neglecting to make any
specific proposals on strengthening the role of Commission Special Rapporteurs and
discussing ways of strengthening role of Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups).
166. See supra notes 62-65, 82-87 and accompanying text (recommending that
States provide impartial, prompt, and thorough investigations into all suspected cases of
extrajudicial executions and documenting flaws in techniques used by Honduran police
to investigate extrajudicial executions).
167. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing issues facing Special Rap-
porteurs, including limited fact-finding guidelines and inaccessibility of certain regions;
urging Commission to strengthen these positions).
168. See supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text (failing to mention situation
of street children in Honduras).
169. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text (reviewing Honduran and inter-
national legal standards which establish right to life and right to be free from torture
and underscoring fundamental importance of such rights).
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are directly implicated in Honduras, where, in many cases, po-
lice are responsible for arbitrarily torturing and murdering
street children.170 Finally, the High Level Panel Proposal recom-
mended that the Commission pay more attention to the imple-
mentation of Security Council Resolutions, yet failed to urge the
Commission to reaffirm its commitment to other authoritative
sources, such as the U.N. Principles and the CRC. 17'1 It seems
fairly clear that the High Level Panel could have more aptly used
its platform to censure violations of the right to life, mount pres-
sure on States like Honduras to better enforce the U.N. Princi-
ples and, ultimately, positively impact the situation of street chil-
dren.172
B. Critique of the Report of Secretary-General
Secretary-General Annan's proposal appropriately envi-
sioned Commission reform as a radical abolition of the current
system in favor of a smaller Human Rights Council. 173 As a more
streamlined body, the Council would be able to address rights
violations in a more active manner. 174 Although the reforms de-
tailed by Secretary-General Annan would positively impact the
implementation of the U.N. Principles, certain additional re-
forms would render Secretary-General Annan's Proposal more
applicable to the specific problem of street children in Hondu-
ras.
1 75
Secretary-General Annan's suggestion that the Council sub-
ject all U.N. Member States to periodic peer review would posi-
170. See supra notes 5-8, 12, 22-24 and accompanying text (documenting instances
of Honduran police assaulting and using torture against street children, as well as par-
ticipating in extrajudicial executions).
171. See supra notes 4243, 81-87, 111 and accompanying text (discussing children's
rights protected by CRC; noting U.N. Principles' standards regarding impartial,
prompt, and thorough investigations of extrajudicial executions; proposing that Com-
mission request High Commissioner for Human Rights to make regular reports on im-
plementation of Security Council resolutions).
172. See supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text (failing to censure violations
of the right to life or mount pressure on Honduras to better enforce U.N. Principles).
173. See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text (describing Secretary-General
Annan's proposal to abolish Commission and create Council in its place).
174. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (critiquing weaknesses of Com-
mission and arguing that it should be abolished).
175. See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text (providing substantive sugges-
tions to reform U.N. human rights machinery but neglecting to include specific provi-
sions addressing situation of street children in Honduras or implementation of U.N.
Principles).
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tively impact the situation of Honduran street children. 176 Thor-
ough peer review would allow the Council to focus on censuring
Honduras for failing to actively police domestic extrajudicial ex-
ecutions and having insufficiently implemented the U.N. Princi-
ples. 177 Peer review would also make it difficult for Honduras to
escape scrutiny or lobby their allies for votes, ensuring that
Council activities would not become politicized.
1 7 1
However, Secretary-General Annan's Proposal that the
Council act as a chamber of peer review too narrowly defines the
scope of Council activities. 179 With respect to the DGIC's imple-
mentation of the U.N. Principles, this point remains extremely
important."18 The Council must be granted broad authority not
only to condemn, monitor, and report rights violations, but also
to reaffirm the international community's commitment to the
proper investigation of extrajudicial executions.' Extensive
peer review and reporting obligations, while necessary, remain
insufficient to compel Honduras to cure the DGIC's weaknesses
and hold perpetrators of extrajudicial executions accounta-
ble. 8 2 To reach this goal, the Council must be granted the
broadest possible authority to censure dubious human rights
practices, establish a more full-time monitoring presence in
Honduras, and recommend the imposition of sanctions to the
176. See supra notes 50-51, 53-54, 56, 59, 66-73, 100 and accompanying text (provid-
ing for peer review of Council Members and documenting extraordinary limitations
facing Honduran law enforcement andjudicial institutions, ranging from endemic pub-
lic lack of faith, incompetence, inefficiency, and poor resources).
177. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (stating that Commission, which
currently lacks peer review mechanisms, has failed to appropriately prevent and con-
demn massive rights violations such as those in Darfur because many Commission Mem-
ber States have dubious rights records).
178. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing Secretary-General An-
nan's proposal to have Council Members be elected by two-thirds majority of Members
and importance of Member States' high human rights standards).
179. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that Secretary-General An-
nan's proposal recognizes that Member States will either prefer Council to stand as
principal U.N. organ or subsidiary body of General Assembly).
180. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (recording instances of poor
DGIC investigation of extrajudicial executions of children in Honduras).
181. See supra note 17 and accompanying text and accompanying text (claiming
that urgency is always involved in cases of extrajudicial executions and, nevertheless,
accountability measures established by States in response do not always produce effec-
tive results).
182. See supra notes 11, 73, 121 and accompanying text (arguing that Council
should engage in peer review of States and urging international community to substan-
tively address extrajudicial executions in Honduras).
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Security Council."'3
Moreover, Secretary-General Annan did not place enough
emphasis on excluding Member States with weak human rights
records from obtaining Council membership."8 4 In choosing
States for positions of leadership on the Council, the General
Assembly must remain extremely attentive to only vote for Mem-
ber States that have strong records of preventing and punishing
extrajudicial executions, and providing special legislative protec-
tions for street children.185 This would ensure that no Member
State with a pattern of permitting extrajudicial executions of
street children would be responsible for censuring Honduras for
doing so, which would, in turn, make it more likely that Hondu-
ras would substantially alter its approach to the protection of
street children.
1 8 6
Recognizing that the Council can serve either as a principal
organ of the United Nations or a subsidiary body of the General
Assembly, Secretary-General Annan did not take a stand on
which framework would better address rights violations."8 7 Prin-
ciple organ status would better address the situation of street
children in Honduras because it would grant the Council the
independence and authority to better oversee the implementa-
tion of the U.N. Principles.1 8  Granting the Council principal
183. See supra notes 11, 121 and accompanying text (proposing peer review of
States as one of Council's main functions and finding that Honduran State must con-
duct effective investigations in order to sanction perpetrators and that this must be
prioritized by Honduran State and international community, as impunity and execu-
tions of minors continues).
184. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text and accompanying text (describ-
ing discredited reputation of Commission as a result of its permitting States with treach-
erous human rights records to join Commission and noting certain States' efforts to
seek membership in order to avoid criticism of their domestic human rights policies).
185. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (discussing extremely weak repu-
tation of Commission due to its admitting States with notoriously poor human rights
records and noting Commission Members' efforts to stymie rights condemnations, lead-
ing to Commission's weakened capacity).
186. See supra notes 97, 121-122 and accompanying text (describing Secretary-Gen-
eral Annan's proposals for Commission reform and arguing that current Commission
maintains weak reputation due to hypocrisy of States with poor human rights reputa-
tions acting as symbolic leadership of U.N. human rights framework).
187. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (recognizing that Member States
will either prefer Council to stand as principal U.N. organ or subsidiary body of General
Assembly).
188. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting HRW Proposal's suggestion
that Council be elevated to organ status within five years and, in meantime, should act
as subsidiary body of General Assembly).
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organ status, moreover, would demonstrate that the U.N. consid-
ers human rights a concern on par with those of peace and se-
curity. 1 8 9
Certain Council recommendations that would generally im-
prove the Honduran State's investigative treatment of extrajudi-
cial executions of street children, however, do not appear in Sec-
retary-General Annan's proposal.1 90 In particular, Secretary-
General Annan could have more fully provided for increased re-
sources for the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Execu-
tions. 9 Similarly, the Secretary-General could have decided to
place particular importance on the protection of civil and politi-
cal rights, such as the right to life, instead of recommending that
all rights-including civil, cultural, economic, political, and so-
cial rights-be addressed with equal urgency.
1 92
C. Critique of the HRW Proposal
Of the discussed proposals, the HRW Proposal best ad-
dressed Commission reform, creating the most workable solu-
tions for the U.N. human rights framework.' 93 With respect to
the situation of street children in Honduras, the HRW Proposal
has the most potential to positively address the DGIC's weak im-
plementation of the U.N. Principles and the Honduran State's
failure to fully hold perpetrators accountable' 94 Advocating the
most groundbreaking changes, HRW recommended abolishing
the Commission and replacing it with a Council that would have
a broad mandate, principal organ status, and wide discretion to
189. See supra notes 112-122 and accompanying text (stating Secretary-General An-
nan's proposal that creating Council would grant human rights more meaningful au-
thority in U.N. system).
190. See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text (including mainly theoretical
recommendations on Council implementation; failing to mention extrajudicial execu-
tions).
191. See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text (neglecting to provide for in-
creased resources for Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions).
192. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (arguing that civil, cultural, eco-
nomic, political, and social rights, including right to development, should be addressed
equally).
193. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text (detailing substantive Com-
mission reforms recommended by international human rights NGO community).
194. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text (providing meaningful gui-
dance on how to address U.N. human rights reform with view towards addressing sub-
stantive rights violations).
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make recommendations to Member States.
195
HRW's recommendation-also advocated by Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi Annan-that the Council's members be elected by a
two-thirds majority, would positively impact the situation of
street children in Honduras. 196 In recent years, Honduras has
been a member of the Commission-a position of power that
has helped shield it from criticism regarding instances of extra-
judicial executions of street children.1 9v A two-thirds majority
vote by Members of the General Assembly would increase the
likelihood that Honduras and other States with histories of extra-
judicial executions would not gain access to influential positions
on the Council.1 98 In turn, this would ensure that the Council
could censure, without influence by the Honduran State, the
poor investigative techniques of the DGIC and unresolved cases
of extrajudicially executed street children. 199
Also, the HRW Proposal made the essential point that the
Council must be a permanent body; the Commission's current
six-week annual session remains insufficient to address the
world's most serious human rights situations.2 °° In terms of
Honduran street children, a permanent Council would have
more time to formulate a plan of action on improving the
DGIC's weak implementation of the U.N. Principles and holding
the Honduran State accountable for preventing the deaths of
195. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text (recommending that Council
be empowered to promote and protect human rights in all countries as well as be
granted authority to report to Member States and other U.N. bodies).
196. See supra notes 100, 130 and accompanying text (describing both HRW and
Annan Proposals as favoring election of Council Members by two-thirds majority vote of
General Assembly Member States)
197. See supra notes 76, 97-99, 100 and accompanying text (discussing Commission
membership of Honduras and critiquing Commission Members for maintaining poor
domestic human rights standards and attempting to thwart human rights condemna-
tions).
198. See supra notes 5-8, 12, 22-24, 100 and accompanying text (documenting in-
stances of Honduran police participating in extrajudicial executions and noting that
HRW Proposal recommends election of Council Members by two-thirds majority vote of
General Assembly Member States).
199. See supra notes 76, 97-99 and accompanying text (explaining hypocrisy of cur-
rent Commission for including Member States with poor human rights records, their
attempts to thwart human rights condemnations and resulting failure of Commission to
meaningfully censure rights violations; noting that Honduras is currently Member of
Commission).
200. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (proposing that Human Rights
Council meet regularly and make timely responses to human rights violations).
2006] THE IMPACT OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS REFORM 857
children.2 ° ' Moreover, a permanent Council would generally al-
low more time for comprehensive follow-up dialogue and report-
ing on situations of urgent concern, such as the extrajudicial ex-
ecutions of street children in Honduras.20 2
Like Secretary-General Annan's proposal, the HRW Propo-
sal would require Council Members to commit themselves to
maintaining the highest domestic human rights standards. 3
This reform remains absolutely critical to improving both the sit-
uation of street children in Honduras and the Council's reputa-
tion within the international community. 20 4 In particular, this
reform would likely result in Honduras losing its influential posi-
tion in the U.N. human rights machinery and being forced to
address its history of permitting extrajudicial executions.20 5
The HRW Proposal also appropriately conceived of the
Council as having transitional five-year status as a subsidiary body
of the General Assembly, eventually reaching principal organ
status.206 Establishing a principal organ body to exclusively ad-
dress rights violations would place human rights concerns on
equal footing with those of international peace and security.207
This would have a positive impact on the monitoring of extraju-
dicial executions in Honduras and the DGIC's implementation
of the U.N. Principles, as it would devote full-time attention to
rights violations.20 8
201. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (underscoring importance of
Council standing as permanent body to better address human rights concerns).
202. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (arguing that permanent, standing
Council would allow more time for substantive follow-up of decisions and resolutions).
203. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that Council Members
should commit themselves to highest human rights standards).
204. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (recommending that Council
Members maintain exceptional human rights records and such records should be con-
sidered in application for membership).
205. See supra notes 76, 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing Commission
membership of Honduras and arguing that Council candidate States must maintain
highest domestic human rights practices).
206. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (recommending that Council
maintain transitional status as subsidiary body of General Assembly, eventually reaching
principal organ status).
207. See supra notes 112, 134 and accompanying text (explaining that Member
States should consider making Commission full-time body with authority akin to Secur-
ity Council; proposing that Council have transitional status as subsidiary body of Gen-
eral Assembly, eventually reaching principal organ status).
208. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (advocating that Council be
granted transitional status as subsidiary body of General Assembly, reaching principal
organ status in future).
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The HRW Proposal, however, did not explicitly recommend
excluding States with dubious rights records from obtaining
Council membership. 20 9 Failing to wholly exclude States with se-
rious domestic rights violations from becoming Members in-
creases the chances that States that permit extrajudicial execu-
tions will become responsible for condemning extrajudicial ex-
ecutions worldwide. 0 Were such an eventuality to ensue, the
Honduran State would have little incentive to improve the
DGIC's implementation of the U.N. Principles and, accordingly,
the situation of street children.211
In sum, the reforms detailed by the HRW Proposal would
positively impact the Honduran DGIC's implementation of the
U.N. Principles and, consequently, the situation of street chil-
dren in Honduras. 212 This proposal best conceived an entirely
new institution composed of Member States with the highest
human rights records-highly efficient, respected, serious, and
streamlined.2 13 Such an institution would ensure more efficient
monitoring of the DGIC's implementation of the U.N. Princi-
ples, more concentrated authority, and consequently, more deci-
sive action. 2
1 4
D. Critique of the Council Draft Text
The Council Draft Text represents a workable point of de-
parture for U.N. human rights reform, appropriately recom-
mending the abolition of the current Commission. 5 Certain
209. See supra notes 141, 143 and accompanying text (describing weight given to
candidates' human rights records; providing that, in being considered for Council
membership, candidates' records with respect to gross violations shall be considered).
210. See supra notes 141, 144 and accompanying text (stating that Council candi-
dates' records with respect to gross violations shall be considered, but failing to wholly
exclude rights violators from membership; reporting Draft Text's emphasis on review of
candidates' human rights records).
211. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (claiming that Commission has
failed to appropriately prevent and condemn massive rights violations such as those in
Darfur because many Commission Member States have treacherous rights records).
212. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text (providing meaningful gui-
dance on how to address U.N. human rights reform with view towards addressing sub-
stantive rights violations).
213. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text (describing defining features
of HRW Proposal).
214. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (arguing that Commission must be
made smaller and must prohibit non-democracies from obtaining membership).
215. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (stating that Council will act as
subsidiary body of General Assembly and Commission will be abolished by June 2006).
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features detailed in the Draft Text would positively impact the
Honduran State's implementation of the U.N. Principles and,
consequently, the situation of street children in Honduras.2 16
Other features that would more fully address the situation of
Honduran street children, however, remain absent from the
Draft Text.
21 7
The Draft Text rightly provided that potential Council
Member States' records should be considered-particularly
their commitments and contributions to human rights.218 This
would likely ensure that Honduras would no longer be able to
maintain a position of power within the U.N. and shield itself
from human rights criticism. 219 Also, the Draft Text correctly
conceived of the Council as a permanent, standing body, with
members selected according to regional representation.22 °
Moreover, the language of the Draft Text explicitly grants
the Council a broad mandate to prevent human rights violations
through dialogue and cooperation, which seems ideal for im-
proving implementation of the U.N. Principles. 221 This lan-
guage, particularly the provision authorizing prompt response,
would appropriately grant the Council the maximum authority
to address the issue.2 22 While this language would theoretically
216. See supra notes 141-147 and accompanying text (discussing Draft Text's
thoughtful reforms on U.N. human rights machinery after gathering input from NGO
community).
217. See supra notes 141-147 and accompanying text (failing to address situation of
street children in Honduras or encourage recommitment to implementation of U.N.
Principles).
218. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (providing that candidates' human
rights backgrounds should be considered in determining membership and discussing
weight Council will give to States' human rights records).
219. See supra notes 76, 97-99 and accompanying text (observing that reputation of
Commission has been weakened by weak domestic human rights policies of Member
States, such as Honduras).
220. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (stating that Council shall meet
regularly and be composed of forty-seven Member States; discussing Council member-
ship and frequency of Council meetings). But see supra note 126 (noting that American
diplomats would prefer Council not to have more than thirty Members).
221. See supra notes 11, 141 and accompanying text (providing broad authority for
Council to address human rights violations and finding that Honduran State must con-
duct effective investigations in order to sanction perpetrators and that this must be
prioritized by Honduran State and international community, as impunity and execu-
tions of minors continue).
222. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text (granting Council authority to
promptly respond to urgent rights situations but neglecting to mention any specific
rights, such as right to life).
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permit the Council to apply greater pressure on Honduras to
implement the U.N. Principles and to expand the role of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions in accomplish-
ing this goal, the Draft Text failed to mention any specific rights
to which the Council should devote greater attention. 221 In reaf-
firming the U.N.'s commitment to better rights enforcement,
the Draft Text could have mentioned particular rights of the
most serious consequence. 22 4 As such, the Council must con-
sider, in its future resolutions, to reaffirm its commitment to en-
suring the most basic rights, such as the right to life, which is
directly implicated in situations of extrajudicial executions. 22 5
The Council should also consider reaffirming the U.N.'s
commitment to encouraging States' complete implementation
of the U.N. Principles.2 2 6 In creating the U.N. Principles, the
U.N. recognized the gravity of extrajudicial executions and the
importance of investigating them in an efficient and impartial
manner. 2 2 7 However, one Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial
Executions cannot possibly monitor poor implementation of the
U.N. Principles at the international level and on a continual ba-
sis. 2 28 This seems particularly clear in Honduras, as little pro-
gress has been reported following former Special Rapporteur
Jahangir's 2003 investigation and report on the extrajudicial ex-
ecutions of Honduran children.229
223. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (reaffirming commitment to
strengthening U.N. human rights machinery in order to promote better enjoyment of
all rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights, as well as right
to development).
224. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing commitment to
strengthening U.N.'s equal promotion of all human rights but failing to mention spe-
cific rights of most serious consequence, such as right to life).
225. See supra notes 30, 141-147 and accompanying text (finding that extrajudicial
executions represent violation of right to life; recommitting U.N. to strengthening
human rights machinery in order to promote better enjoyment of all rights but failing
to mention right to life).
226. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (documenting States' failure to
wholly implement U.N. Principles).
227. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing international com-
munity's motivation for creating U.N. Principles as alarm at continued instances of ex-
trajudicial executions and providing for complete, impartial, and thorough investiga-
tions into all possible instances of extrajudicial executions).
228. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing mandate of Special Rap-
porteur as transmitting urgent appeals in cases of imminent executions, undertaking
fact-finding country visits and submitting annual reports on his mandate).
229. See supra notes 5, 11, 25 and accompanying text (discussing recommendations
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Although the U.N. initially affirmed its commitment to the
investigation of extrajudicial executions through the U.N. Princi-
ples-a brilliant model for States to follow-it must do more to
ensure they are seriously implemented, especially in Hondu-
ras. 230 In particular, non-binding U.N. Principles that provide
for little consequence for poor implementation do not ade-
quately compel States to reallocate law enforcement and judicial
resources to provide for more meaningful investigations. 21 ' The
Council should consider either making the U.N. Principles bind-
ing or imposing some sort of penalty when States like Honduras
fail to implement them.232
During a time of momentous change in U.N. human rights
institutions, the Council must pledge to take a more active role
in aiding the Honduran State's implementation of the U.N.
Principles. 23  In this sense, the Council should consider
strengthening the role of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudi-
cial Executions and apply greater pressure on the Honduran
Government to better implement the U.N. Principles, especially
in cases involving street children. 2 4 As part of this effort, the
Council might consider devoting greater budgetary and person-
nel resources to the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Execu-
tions or perhaps establishing a Working Group, under his or her
supervision, to monitor the investigative techniques of the Hon-
duran DGIC.233
of former Special Rapporteur Asma Jahangir and documenting instances of extrajudi-
cial executions of Honduran children in recent years).
230. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting motivation for creating Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions as international alarm at violations of right
to life).
231. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing non-binding status of
U.N. Principles and their place in international customary law).
232. See supra notes 17, 81-90 and accompanying text (noting that, although U.N.
Principles do not legally bind States, they represent persuasive authority; listing many
States' shortcomings with respect to implementation of U.N. Principles).
233. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (mentioning certain States' weak
implementation of U.N. Principles).
234. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (doubting effectiveness of Commis-
sion procedures, such as those of Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, and
urging Commission to strengthen roles of Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups).
235. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting logistical challenges facing
Special Rapporteurs and urging Commission to strengthen roles of Special Rapporteurs
and Working Groups).
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CONCLUSION
The American Convention and the Velasquez-Rodriguez case
make clear that States must protect their citizens from the threat
of arbitrary murder and extrajudicial execution.23 6 When States
fail to adequately protect this right, an obligation arises on their
part to use appropriate diligence in investigating and prosecut-
ing the crimes, and to provide meaningful information to vic-
tims' families.237 To that end, the U.N..Principles provide a solid
framework for realizing the duty to investigate cases of arbitrary
murder. 238 Many States, however, struggle to meet these stan-
dards. 23 '9 The limited implementation assistance provided by the
U.N. and the lack of punitive consequences for poor implemen-
tation do not encourage States to comply with the standards set
forth in the U.N. Principles.2 4 °
The example of Honduras demonstrates that some States
have fallen strikingly short of fulfilling their obligation to effec-
tively investigate and prosecute the arbitrary murder of street
children in accordance with the U.N. Principles. 241 The Hondu-
ran investigative police agencies suffer from severe budgetary
problems, logistical mismanagement, corruption, and a perva-
sive lack of faith, among Honduran citizens, in law enforcement
branches.2 4 2 The lack of complete, efficient, speedy, and uni-
form investigations renders the Honduran criminal justice sys-
tem fragile and promotes a regime of impunity and arbitraryjus-
236. See supra notes 28, 32, 43 and accompanying text (reviewing Honduran legis-
lation that grants right to life from moment of conception and States' duty to protect
this right; discussing States' duties under CRC to protect lives of children).
237. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (noting legal obligations im-
posed by Velasquez-Rodriguez decision).
238. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (stating that there shall be im-
partial, prompt, and thorough investigations of all extrajudicial executions, facilitated
through government offices and standardized procedures).
239. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (documenting that States such as
Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Russia, and Sri Lanka have not adequately investigated certain
cases of extrajudicial executions).
240. See supra notes 81, 89-90 and accompanying text (concluding that U.N. Princi-
ples are not binding on States but stand as persuasive authority relied upon by Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions and States).
241. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing investigative tech-
niques that police often use in investigating extrajudicial executions of Honduran street
children).
242. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (reviewing logistical challenges
facing Honduran police and documenting budgetary problems and corruption within
Honduran police agencies).
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tice. Moreover, the limited sense of redress for victims and their
families weakens public perceptions of the police and of the le-
gitimacy ofjudicial institutions. 243 The inquiry, however, cannot
be focused solely on the Honduran State and judiciary, as poor
implementation of the U.N. Principles affects justice world-
wide.
244
The proposals put forth by Secretary-General Kofi Annan
and HRW appropriately conceived of U.N. human rights reform
not as a mere restructuring of the Commission on Human
Rights, but as a complete overhaul of the current framework
through the creation of a Human Rights Council. This ap-
proach is absolutely necessary to repair a fundamental institu-
tion that carries the burden of monitoring rights worldwide. In
today's age, the U.N.'s human rights framework is often the only
means of shining light on rights violations and censuring them
using the strength of the international community's voice. Few
other international institutions have a mandate equivalent in
scope to that of the Commission, and yet, limited resources,
politicization, and the hypocrisy of Member States prevent the
Commission from condemning rights violations and realizing its
mandate. This notion must remain prominent on the interna-
tional community's agenda as it restructures the U.N.'s human
rights framework.
Other considerations should also shape the creation of the
Council. The Council must approach human rights reform not
only as a simple reworking of the U.N.'s structural framework,
but also as an opportunity to reaffirm the international commu-
nity's commitment to certain rights. In particular, the Council
must devote attention to the implementation of the U.N. Princi-
ples; consider strengthening the role of the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial Executions; and explore options to create a per-
manent committee to monitor implementation of the U.N. Prin-
ciples.
The Council, through its purpose, mission, and mandate,
has the potential to strengthen the U.N.'s monitoring of investi-
gations of extrajudicial executions worldwide. Doing so would
243. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing weak public percep-
tions of Honduran police officers).
244. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (finding that States such as Burkina
Faso, Nigeria, Russia, and Sri Lanka have not adequately investigated certain cases of
extrajudicial executions).
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lead to an increased overall effectiveness and faith in investiga-
tions and prosecutions as well as greater crime deterrence in
countries like Honduras. Most importantly, strengthening the
implementation of the U.N. Principles would lead to a greater
sense of justice for some of the neediest and most vulnerable
victims of extrajudicial executions-street children.
